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ABSTRACT 
As terrorism threatens a democratic nation, there tends to be an aversion to deploying 
military forces to combat the internal threat—rightfully so, as it speaks to democratic 
principles of rule of law.  Because of this tendency, democratic nations tend to focus on 
law enforcement as the key to a successful counterterrorism strategy.  This research effort 
studies the use of police in two comparable western democracies, Italy and Germany, to 
determine areas in which police effectively supported the national counterterrorism 
strategy.  It suggests a model for analysis that posits police professionalism, preventative 
methodology, adaptation of technologies, and interagency cooperation as four areas in 
which improvements can be made to make police more effective.   It finds that despite 
different political and social conditions in each country, changes made within these four 
areas consistently contributed to successful national counterterrorism efforts.  These 
findings are further relevant to the current state of counterterrorism efforts in the United 
States.  Lessons from these case studies indicate that Homeland Security efforts should 
focus on centralization of police efforts, legislation to encourage preventive policing, 
integrated technology efforts, and more interagency cooperation to ensure a successful 
internal security environment. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
While the armed forces figure prominently in international efforts to combat 
terrorism outside of national borders, the truth remains that democratic nations tend not to 
employ a military solution to terrorism within their borders.  Instead, the typical response 
to domestic threats is based on law enforcement, and specifically on police agencies to 
deter, detect, and investigate terrorist threats.  Some might also add that the public 
expects police involvement as the localized means of response in keeping citizenry safe 
and achieving justice in the face of a security threat.1  This circumstance places an 
importance on understanding how police agencies undertake this effort and, more 
importantly, points to a need to identify which policing methods have been effective in 
democratic states against terrorist threats. 
A. IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE 
This debate is current and timely, considering the spread of terrorism across the 
globe in the past ten years.  The problem of police effectiveness is applicable to the 
United States specifically, with its thousands of jurisdictional departments and numerous 
other state, regional, and national police agencies whose jurisdictions overlap or, in some 
cases, conflict.  In such a system, divergent ideas, methods, and strategies might be 
employed to various effects.  This decentralization and compartmentalization also may 
discourage communication and discussion of approaches and their effectiveness.  Other 
democratic states have faced similar challenges and arrived at solutions that could 
provide valuable insights to U.S. counterterrorism officials.  The present work analyzes 
police activities in successful counterterrorism campaigns in two such states, Italy and the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), to find effective means of combatting terrorism, 
both homegrown and exogenous, through the criminal justice system.    
A theoretical debate not only addresses the involvement of the police in 
counterterrorism, but it begins more broadly from the point of view that a democratic 
                                                 
1  Vincent E. Henry, “The Need for a Coordinated and Strategic Local Police Approach to Terrorism: 
A Practitioner’s Perspective,” Police Practice & Research 3, no. 4 (December 2002): 321. 
 2 
nation must protect its citizenry while also upholding the rule of law and liberal values on 
which the state is founded.  This viewpoint accepts that terrorists pose a threat to national 
security, but it also insists that the actions a state takes to deal with the threat could 
degrade democracy and civil liberties. This anxiety, well founded in the early 
counterterrorism experience of most democracies, including the United States, limits the 
means and methods available to counter terrorist threats.2  Thus, the democratic response 
to terrorism tends to treat terrorism as a crime, or at least something that can be addressed 
within criminal justice systems.  Lindsay Clutterbuck describes this approach as the 
“criminal justice” theoretical framework for counterterrorism strategy, emphasizing the 
need for democratic countries to deal with terrorism within the rule of law in order to 
protect liberal democratic values.3  An unchecked police force, which does not observe 
these limits of democratic governance, might lead to the very threat that democracies try 
to avoid by restricting domestic military force—authoritarian-type rule. 
The tension between the military solution and the law-enforcement option plays 
out at every level of the counterterrorist response.  As a practitioner of criminal justice 
and counterterrorism from within the military of the United States, the author has seen 
instances where the immediate reaction of local police to a threat has been to place 
overwhelming forces within a troublesome area in hopes of suppressing nefarious 
activities.  This method, as an example, focuses on military tactics of battlefield 
saturation and denial instead of tried-and-true policing methods for learning about and 
dealing with the threat at its source.  While there is a certain short-term charm to the 
former approach, only the latter suggests a longer-term solution that addresses the root of 
the problem.   
This research effort will attempt to further the knowledge of police effectiveness 
in counterterrorism by specifically seeking out areas of police effectiveness exhibited in 
the counterterrorism efforts of the FRG and Italy.  Which areas of police effort were 
                                                 
2 Boaz Ganor and David Weisburd, “Trends in Modern International Terrorism,” in To Protect and To 
Serve: Policing in an Age of Terrorism, eds. David Weisburd et al. (New York: Springer, 2009), 33. 
3 Lindsay Clutterbuck, “Law Enforcement,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy, 
eds. Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004), 
142. 
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effective in diminishing the terrorist threat for the countries of Italy and Germany in their 
respective counterterrorism campaigns against right- and left-wing terrorist groups? This 
thesis will investigate the effectiveness of their strategies, with an eye toward 
generalizing the experience for a wider consideration in the United States and elsewhere. 
The study of FRG and Italy allows the reader to identify effects of police 
contributions to counterterrorism within stable and higher-income democracies that were 
affected by domestic terrorist attacks as perpetrated by nationally and internationally 
based terrorist organizations.  Unlike the efforts in the United Kingdom, which centered 
on a military response, the German and Italian efforts use domestic law enforcement 
agencies exclusively.  The United States is likely to continue further improvements in 
homeland security and defense that rely heavily on police participation.  Thus, from the 
Italian and German experiences, one may be able to draw conclusions as to the areas 
where resources and policy can be applied to better inform police efforts in current 
counterterrorism campaigns. 
B. PROBLEMS AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis shows successful counterterrorism campaigns as a product of 
improvements in both the structure and methods of policing within Italy and Germany 
during their counterterrorism campaigns against left-wing and right-wing terrorism.  Both 
of these countries went through a transition of all-encompassing strategies of 
counterterrorism over distinct periods that also coincided with changes in police activities 
and styles.   
1. A Model for Analysis 
The research develops a model for analysis that attempts to track changes in 
police behavior based on common recurring themes in successful national strategies for 
counterterrorism.  These four areas, which tend to be conventional areas of policing 
effort, are: the ability to adopt a professional policing model, use of preventive 
investigative tools versus oppressive techniques, adaptation and use of technology, and 
increased cooperation amongst police agencies inside and outside of the state.  This 
model allows for the creation of measures of effectiveness in these areas and the analysis 
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of them in the context of the counterterrorist activities of the FRG and Italy, answering 
the question of what has been effective in policing terrorism. 
A further possible benefit of the research may be ways to increase effectiveness of 
the police, based not on the type of terrorist threat or structure of policing organizations 
exhibited within a certain country but on finding ways to increase police capabilities to 
support national counterterrorism strategies.  Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw 
suggest that there are four themes in successful overall governmental strategies for 
countering terrorism: effective command and control structures, legitimizing measures on 
the part of government including legislation sensitive to public opinion, coordination 
within and between intelligence services, and cooperation between different countries.4   
Governments, have additional measures used to combat terrorism, including but not 
limited to military, defensive measures, and infrastructure protection.  However, it makes 
sense, given a national strategy that seeks to maintain rule of law that a similar set of 
qualities should be sought out in looking at police effectiveness, which will allow for 
linkage of police effectiveness to national strategy.  This research effort focusses on how 
police can increase effectiveness as part of a broader national strategy.  The key 
indicators in this study—police professionalism, methodology, use of technology, and 
cooperation—provide this link.   
a. Police Professionalism 
For our purposes, professional policing relates to how police are able to 
adopt standardized methods and procedures.  The best place to find police 
professionalism is in the structure and training of an organization that, optimally, allows 
police both to look the part and to act in a manner that produces results; such a structure 
also must avoid the image or substance of a system easily corrupted or excessively 
powerful.  The structure, organization, and training reveal whether or not there similar 
characteristics and rules across the spectrum of law enforcement agencies.  Thus efforts 
should be coordinated and even-handed, without difference based on race, color, or 
                                                 
4 Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, “A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism,” in 
European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, 
ed. Fernando Reinares (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), 9–10. 
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creed—in line with the ideals of liberal democracy and national counterterrorism 
strategies that rely on a public accounting of how the government reacts swiftly and 
without bias to deal with threats to law and order internally, supporting a legitimate 
government that meets democratic norms.   It follows that as law enforcement agencies 
establish common methods, the command, and control of a nation’s counterterrorism 
efforts should also improve.  Similarly, legitimacy of the government is bolstered by its 
ability to show control and restraint over all police agencies through standardization and 
education, which protects against the idea that two different officials or organizations 
may act arbitrarily based on personal or political preference.5       
b. Preventative Policing 
Preventative policing is a hard concept to pin down due to divergent definitions of 
what might be preventative, lumping in measures which attempt to form a barrier or 
prophylactic effect.  Such measures should better be thought of as deterrent or deflective 
of the threat, meaning the threat is not just defended at the point of occurrence.  For the 
purposes of this research, “preventative” explains the ways in which police address the 
underlying causes of terrorism or, more importantly, the criminal nexus that leads to or 
fosters terrorism.  It is one thing to bolster security around sites and conduct random 
searches as deterrence; it is another thing entirely to seek out those who might plan, 
coordinate, and carry out terrorist acts in an attempt to disrupt and destroy the cycle of 
violence—crime.  Especially today, a simple look at open news sources shows that 
society worries about the “lone-wolf” terrorist, or criminal who does not belong to a 
network, as it is difficult to detect and disrupt the actions of a single person.  However, in 
my experience and that of law enforcement in general, cases of terrorism and organized 
violence exhibit a support network and association of people with the same values.  At a 
minimum, any action on a large scale requires some level of planning and preparation.  A 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 11.  An indication of weak command-and-control structures is an uncoordinated response 
among government agencies and can also lead to suggestions of corruption and illegitimacy.  Given that 
public relations are considered a battleground in counterterrorism and distrust of the government is counter 
to legitimacy in conducting counterterrorism campaigns systems within the national government should 
seek to present as even-handed, well-trained, and highly coordinated agencies.  
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thorough investigation of these networks can aid the police in reducing occurrences and 
thwarting terroristic or criminal plans.   
The idea of building a case against a particular suspect is at the heart of 
the democratic principle of justice, which focuses on individual culpability and 
responsibility.  Intelligence-led efforts are the strongest characteristic of the investigative 
concept, purporting that analysis of information to target specific criminal behaviors, are 
better than reactionary measures based on crimes that have already occurred.6  The study 
of how police investigate and attempt to prevent terrorism within the laws of the land has 
direct bearing on the legitimacy of the government, and its dedication to criminal 
prosecution as a premise of democratic norms.   
c. Adaptation of Technology Components 
Technology should be thought of as an enabler for law enforcement and a 
necessary component in meeting national counterterrorism strategies.  Police must be 
able to communicate with each other, and they must also have a way of storing the 
investigative data they collect.  Additionally, technology allows the collection of 
information, especially in light of surveillance techniques, which have developed rapidly 
in the latter part of the twentieth century.  Police technologies, especially in 
communication and information sharing, directly affect how information is transformed 
into action, ideally in a coordinated effort.  The coordination and dissemination of 
intelligence is considered the most important feature in building intelligence capabilities 
critical to national counterterrorism strategy.7   Studying police technologies adapted to 
this end shows how police agencies have brought the information to the field and how 
technologies have aided in interoperability and coordination with other organizations.  
Finally, the way police work within the law to utilize technology to gather intelligence 
bolsters police investigative capabilities and supports democratic norms and criminal 
                                                 
6 The concept of investigation has long been a premise of crime fighting requiring that police attempt 
to determine the roots of the criminal nexus if they are to have a chance at ending a particular trend or 
putting a specific criminal entity out of business.  Kristof Verfaillie and Tom Vander Beken, “Proactive 
Policing and the Assessment of Organized Crime,” Policing 31, no. 4 (2008): 535. 
7  Hoffman and Morrison-Taw, “A Strategic Framework,” 17. 
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prosecution for the overall counterterrorism strategy.  The adoption of technology and 
law which enables its exploitation becomes even more important as the ever increasing 
evolution of technology becomes available to terrorists and the public.    
d. Interagency Cooperation 
Interagency cooperation is pretty simple inasmuch as without it, 
coordinating actions is impossible.  The actions of the police may follow the textbook to 
the letter, but if the agency at issue does not cooperate with other law enforcement 
agencies, such other governmental functions as the judiciary branch, or within an 
international framework, their actions will not contribute to the overall national 
counterterrorism strategy.  The setup of international organizations, cooperation with 
prosecutions, and interaction with national and public agencies can all be indicators of 
police cooperation.  Cooperation is vitally important as a means of not only 
demonstrating a government strategy, which promotes democratic norms of compromise 
and cooperation, but also in indicating a proactive approach. Especially in the 
international aspect, cooperation also shows that the police are seeking out a solution to 
the terrorist problem by all means legally available.  
2. Methodology 
As this research effort will attempt to compare police effectiveness in the 
counterterrorism campaigns in Italy and the FRG, the basic analytical method will consist 
of comparative case studies.  These studies will focus on both states from the 1960s 
through the 1980s, corresponding with the campaigns of each country against right-wing 
and left-wing terrorism during this period.  The purpose of this comparative analysis is to 
identify empirical factors that indicate effective use of police in combatting terrorism.  
The choice of Italy and Germany as subjects for this study allows comparison of two 
countries with similar democratic forms of government, facing and mitigating similar 
forms of terrorism, in order to isolate positive effects on a singular dependent variable, 
namely police effectiveness.     
The dependent variable is affected by such independent variables as state policies, 
terrorist actions, police organization, agency collaboration, and introduction of 
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technology.  The study of police effectiveness will show which independent variables 
most influenced successful counterterrorism campaigns.  By studying police 
effectiveness, conclusions may be drawn as to how a state and its police organizations 
might set policy, distribute resources, and organize forces to be effective in countering 
terrorist threats.   
The research will rely on a range of books and articles published on the subject.  
Additionally, many source documents are available (in translation) from the respective 
governments that can provide helpful in factual representation of how the 
counterterrorism campaign was conducted.  The research model does not include 
interviews of participants or the establishment of new sets of first-hand data.  Instead, this 
work relies on published records and studies of the subject area, as the basis of 
interpretation.  The focus is on data that is peer-reviewed, which may come from subject 
matter expertise and provide a legitimate test for the framework of analysis proposed in 
this research.  The author has developed this framework through this study of 
counterterrorism strategy and exposure to both military and civilian policing techniques, 
tactics, and procedures resulting from a fourteen-year career in military law enforcement. 
C. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to identify methods by which countries can 
successfully implement police policies against terrorist threats.  While it would be too 
much to ask to find a silver bullet or golden arrow for successfully combatting terrorism, 
it is always beneficial to attempt to find historical evidence that may help guide one in 
making decisions about the future.  This thesis will be structured to identify best the 
characteristics of effective policing that might be applicable today and in the future.   
It begins by developing a method for analysis, which can then be used for a 
comparative look at the characteristics of counterterrorism strategy in Germany and Italy.  
This will help to portray the similarities and contradictions in governmental structures, 
police agencies, terrorist groups and public reaction that will form the basis for 
comparing police effectiveness between the two countries.  By describing the underlying 
conditions of the two countries, the research joins the discussion of the problem with a 
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common starting point that allows for specific study of polices and methods that were 
introduced or refined to combat terrorism.   
The research will focus on policies of the state carried out by police against 
terrorism.  Each problem area identified—police autonomy, investigative methodology, 
use of technology, and police cooperation—will be compared between the states to 
identify their specific effectiveness.  Together, these case studies provide the evidence of 
effective use of police, revealing how actions of the police disrupted the terrorist 
organizations and normalized the threat of terrorism.  
Finally, the thesis will draw conclusions about what can be learned from this 
study, for all democracies confronted by terrorism and for the United States especially.  
In particular, the intent is to answer the overall question of what policing methods can aid 
in a successful counterterrorism campaign. This answer is best conceived by setting the 
conditions, identifying the ways in which the system was coerced and then studying the 
results of these changes.  The hope is that by first describing the countries that fight 
terrorism, then dissecting the methods by which they sought success, a reader can draw 
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II. POLICING FOR COUNTERRORISM 
The study of policing terrorism has been documented to a large extent with the 
concentration on how and why police are involved in combatting terrorism.  The primary 
areas of study include theoretical frameworks for adopting police models of 
counterterrorism, the use of police as an institutional response to terrorism, and 
arguments as to methods of policing that might be effective in fighting terrorism.  The 
study of how police become effective in counterterrorism is a subset of the latter area—
and is relatively less studied than the areas of counterterrorism strategy and institutional 
responses.  The following chapter will highlight the area of police effectiveness as it 
flows from the three major research areas: theories of counterterrorism strategy, the state 
or institutional response and policing models.   
A. THEORIES OF COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY 
While the subject of police and terrorism is not a common theme in developing a 
strategic counterterrorism framework, it is an implied outcome of what most scholars 
refer to as the criminal justice theory of counterterrorism.  Study in this area shows that 
protection of civil liberties and government legitimacy in the eyes of the public dictates 
that the rule of law should prevail in framing responses to terrorism.8  The supposition 
here appears to be that working within an established framework for application of law 
and order, the state can minimize the grievances of a terrorist group and counter public 
support for the terrorist’s campaign of violence.  In fact, some also argue that many of the 
actions of terrorists—murder, kidnapping and arson—easily qualify as criminal acts 
when removed from the political goals that terrorism pursue.9 As such, many states 
typically choose to pursue a criminal justice model, arguing that terrorists have the 
chance to seek redress for their grievances through established (peaceful) democratic 
processes and any violent acts are merely criminal outbursts.  In contrast, when the state 
treats terrorists as enemies of the state and activates a military or militarized solution, the 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 13. 
9 Ganor and Weisburd, “Trends in Modern International Terrorism,” 21. 
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argument runs, the group has achieved some measure of legitimacy for its political goals 
through the use of violence.   
Many scholars point to the counter-theory to criminal justice, or the 
“counterterrorism as war” model.  This model relies on the use of force and suspension of 
some rights as a basis in the name of fighting terrorism; this approach does not place the 
same emphasis on protecting civil liberties and maintaining rule of law.10   This approach 
typically takes counterterrorism as a military matter—a matter of national security, after 
all—and, thus, puts the response on a very different footing, institutionally, legally, and 
culturally. The difference underscores the divergent approaches to the problem of 
terrorism and points to an important decision that governments face between utilizing 
police over military institutions, with an emphasis on keeping the two separate to prevent 
the militarization of democratic states.11    
B.   THE STATE OR INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE  
 One might frame institutional responses to terrorism as the policies put in place 
to combat terrorism or political violence, placing value in the effectiveness of their 
results.12 The study of these policies within democratic states tends to focus first on the 
implementation of legislation to support the counterterrorism strategy of the state and 
then on the implementation of that legislation.  This development coincides with what 
some characterize as the primary duty of the government—protection of its citizens—and 
differs mostly in steering state action to counter the terrorist threat, as opposed to trying 
to isolate the widely varying causes of terrorism.13 In short, the study of institutional 
responses advances the idea that states are more apt to adopt policies to counter terrorist 
acts and bring to justice terrorists for their actions than they are to address political 
grievances.   
                                                 
10 Clutterbuck, “Law Enforcement,” 142. 
11 Mathieu Deflem, “Social Control and the Policing of Terrorism: Foundations for a Sociology of 
Counterterrorism,” American Sociologist 35, no. 2, (Summer 2004): 77. 
12 Donatella Della Porta, “Institutional Responses to Terrorism:  The Italian Case,” Terrorism and 
Political Violence 4, no. 4 (1993): 152. 
13 Juliet Lodge, Terrorism: A Challenge to the State, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 227. 
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Another notable trend in this debate is a logical focus on political influence and 
public debate in policies for implementing counterterrorism strategy.  Alternatively, the 
focus of politicians and public in demanding protection from terrorists, particularly in 
Europe, is invoked as evidence that the terrorist threat is not based on what citizens 
would consider a plausible grievance by the terrorists.14 Much of the literature that 
focuses on the implementation of criminal-justice–based strategies emphasizes the ability 
of the state to pass laws that target the terrorist actions while continuing to protect the 
rights of its citizens.  Germany demonstrates this type of “rallying around” government 
policies toward terrorism, where political debate turned toward focus on finding 
consensus so the government could act swiftly rather than ride out repeated debate over 
the merits of addressing terrorist grievances.15  Another scholar similarly argues that the 
sole responsibility of the government when facing a threat of political violence is to 
ensure political argument can prevail and that reasoning replaces violence.16  Debate is 
key to democracy, but this debate must find compromise and move forward or run the 
risk of making the government ineffective.  The study of institutional responses seems to 
focus on the ability of the state to deal with terrorism as a part of its normal functions, 
honing in on those areas where policy is tweaked to allow the state to apply resources to 
the problem. To this end, democracy continues on unhindered despite a terrorist threat.   
C. RECONCILING CRIME AND TERRORISM AS CHALLENGES TO THE 
POLICE  
If policing has effects on terrorism as a means of supporting national 
counterterrorism strategies then the study of terrorism would benefit from a model that 
attempts to categorize police methods and techniques as they are engaged to combat 
terrorism. The areas of organization, methodology, technology and cooperation all are 
keys, in both addressing a threat and aligning to take action.   
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Geoffrey Pridham, “Terrorism and the State in West Germany During the 1970’s:  A Threat to 
Stability or a Case of Political Over-Reaction?” in Terrorism  : A Challenge to the State, ed. Juliet Lodge 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 37. 
16 John Finn, Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of Law (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 41. 
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Figure 1 suggests that the overarching counterterrorism strategy of a nation can be 
supported by elements of four policing areas.  The areas have specific qualities that can 
support or hinder the five characteristics of a democratic counterterrorism strategy.  See 
Figure 1 for a specific listing of these characteristics. 
 
Figure 1.   Policing Characteristics for National Counterterrorism Strategy 
1. Professional Policing 
The idea of professional policing begins with a police force that is structured to 
conduct a policing mission, capably resourced, trained, and in possession of consistent 
standards.  The mere fact that police are political entities of the state indicates that this 
standard is sometimes difficult to achieve.  Budget constraints, public relations, and 
personal preferences all play a role in shaping policies.  As one author notes, the power of 
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the police extends from the sovereignty of the state and is always distinguished by 
“political, social, economic, and legal systems and cultures.”17  However, to be effective 
against a terrorist threat, the influence of these factors must be constrained to a point that 
they do not adversely affect the national counterterrorism strategy.   The data gathered in 
this research shows that some centralization of police forces to act autonomously from 
splintered local politics and in a common manner towards a national strategy is needed.  
This proposition supports the idea that a professional police force might take the form of 
common minimum standards, professional associations, or national-level coordinating 
structures and should result in a coordinated or at least similar level of effort across all 
jurisdictional levels.     
In Italy, the early post-World War II police system was a loosely controlled 
system, mainly concerned with public order in local areas where the police lived and 
worked, barely able to vary techniques and tools for law enforcement.18 As the threat of 
terrorism grew, the approach moved to more centralized national control and less party-
dictated oversight, culminating in centralization under the minister of the interior.19 This 
development indicates that successful raids, captures, and disrupted plots flowing out of 
this transformation were results of a professionalized police model.  In Germany, 
similarly, the 1983 model police code defined the extent of police powers and the rights 
of citizens, synchronizing police practices and taking political or personal nuances out of 
the equation.20   From this background, establishing common standards for policing either 
through centralization or with minimum standards resulted in a more professional agency, 
better able to carry out the domestic counterterrorism functions and protect the legitimacy 
of the national government. 
                                                 
17 Ethan Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law 
Enforcement, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 5. 
18 Luciana Stortoni-Wortmann, “The Police Response to Terrorism in Italy from 1969-1983,” in 
European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies and Intergovernmental Cooperation, 
ed. Fernando Reinares (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000), 155. 
19 Vittorfranco S. Pisano, “Terrorism in Italy: The ‘Dozier Affair’,” The Police Chief 49, no. 4 (April 
1982): 40. 
20 Peter Katzenstein, West Germany’s Internal Security Policy: State and Violence in the 1970s and 
1980s (Ithaca, NY: Center for International Studies Cornell University, 1990), 47.  
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2. Investigative Versus Reactive Methods 
A measure of how police implement legislation designed to find and target 
terrorists reveals the extent to which a government is affecting the public it is trying to 
protect.  A measure of effectiveness of police trying to eliminate terrorism without 
detrimental effect to the society might be found in the extent to which police use reactive 
and sometimes coercive means in combatting terrorism. Intrusive and aggressive security 
measures characteristic of robust reaction to a threat, no matter how effective, have 
repercussions for the general public.  An initial focus on organizing police for 
paramilitary-type responses to terrorism was seen following Germany’s failure to mount 
a successful response to terrorist attacks during the 1972 Munich Olympics.21  But a 
police force focused on creating units that use military techniques and tactics might give 
the appearance of a state that is concerned with order and control more than rule of law 
and civil liberties.  For example, the Italian refusal to demilitarize police forces after 
World War II left them unprepared for investigating and dealing with organized political 
violence during the early 1970s when terrorism saw its greatest rise as the military 
structure was better designed to react to demonstration and to maintain order through 
control of territory.22  Systematic investigation and mitigation of the threat through 
gained insight was more beneficial in legitimizing the government.     
This aspect might be particularly revealing for police effectiveness in the case of 
Italy where in 1980 legislation was passed that reduced sentencing for those who had 
renounced their violent adherence to a terrorist group’s ideology and would provide help 
to the government in seeking out yet-to-be revealed offenders.  This policy differed from 
oppressive measures that allowed warrantless searches of neighborhoods suspected to 
contain terrorists and had a positive effect in that it put pressure on clandestine terrorist 
organizations for fear of being revealed and in turn prosecuted.23  By this method, the 
police were able to focus on investigation and information gathering against individuals 
                                                 
21 Pridham, “Terrorism and the State in West Germany,” 33. 
22 Della Porta, “Institutional Responses to Terrorism,” 159. 
23 Leonard Weinberg and William Lee Eubank, The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1987), 129. 
 17 
based on informant information rather than on a reactive model targeting large portions 
of the population.  Thus, as police focus moves from reactionary steps and escalating 
violence to a model that investigates and gathers information effectively to prevent 
violence, democratic values are promoted and government legitimacy is affirmed, 
benefitting counterterrorism strategy.   
3. Adaptation and Exploitation of Technology   
With national counterterrorism strategy focused on intelligence and information 
as keys to the understanding and countering terrorist threats, it follows that police need 
this information to be successful in their efforts.  Thus, they also require reliable methods 
and techniques for receiving and processing intelligence that is useful to investigations.  
The sheer volume of information that is in use by police means law enforcement must 
leverage technology not only for producing actionable intelligence, but also to 
communicate information to coordinate actions.24  The question here is whether or not 
improvements in technology with regards to identifying, tracking, and developing cases 
against terrorists make the police more effective in supporting national counterterrorism 
strategies or not.  While this research focusses on periods prior to the explosion of 
personal computing and interconnectivity, it is applicable as it speaks to the importance 
of police utilizing the latest tools available.   
In Italy, a Centre for Computerized Information was developed in 1981 and 
centralized under the Ministry of the Interior, providing an archive that collected all data 
with regard to police activities that proved helpful in coordinating counterterrorism 
activities.25 Germany also leveraged technology. Computer databases and mobile 
technology allowing individual police officers to access information in the field were 
introduced in the late 1970s into the early 1980s and are being credited with improving 
the usefulness of police information.26  This thesis will argue that technologies designed 
                                                 
24 Jack R. Greene and Sergio Herzog, “The Implications of Terrorism on the Formal and Social 
Organization of Policing in the US and Israel:  Some Concerns and Opportunities,” in To Protect and To 
Serve:  Policing in an Age of Terrorism, eds. David Weisburd et al. (New York: Springer, 2009), 166. 
25 Della Porta, “Institutional Responses to Terrorism,” 160. 
26 Katzenstein, West Germany’s Internal Security Policy, 19.   
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to improve policing effectiveness did in fact support national counterterrorism strategies 
for coordinated intelligence efforts and centralized control of efforts to combat terrorism.  
The following chapters examine the ways in which technologies were introduced and 
utilized to bring information to action within this context, to illuminate the impact of 
technology on police effectiveness against terrorism.  Technology that enables the police 
to coordinate and share intelligence increases coordination vital to the overall effort and 
allows for more productive investigations.   
4. Increased Cooperation 
The problem of cooperation among policing activities can be seen on multiple 
levels and comes primarily from two sources.  The first area of concern is within the 
state, resulting in disjointed efforts of the different police agencies both national and 
local.  In the case of Italy, the lack of cooperation domestically resulted in an internal 
security system characterized by police agencies that acted as rivals in an uncoordinated 
manner.27  The second problem of coordination stems from a terrorist threat that can 
move across borders, requiring a level of coordination across countries.  Specifically, 
terrorists take advantage of movement across borders that exacerbate the problem of 
jurisdictional friction and the lack of interoperability.28  In Germany, this realization led 
to a strong push in the 1970s toward developing European collaboration in countering 
terrorism.29  As terrorism becomes more and more a global phenomenon, the importance 
of international efforts to combat transnational terrorism is magnified.  The increase in 
domestic cooperation in Italy and international cooperation in Germany further improved 
police effectiveness against terrorism and aided in successful counterterrorism 
campaigns.   
                                                 
27 Paul Furlong, “Political Terrorism in Italy:  Responses, Reactions and Immobilism,” in Terrorism: 
A Challenge to the State, ed. Juliet Lodge (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 81.  
28 Nadelmann, Cops Across Borders, 6.   
29 Katzenstein, West Germany’s Internal Security Policy, 53.   
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C.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POLICE   
Two schools of thought appear to be born of the study of how state agencies, and 
specifically police, carryout counterterrorism policies.  One supposes that despite 
politically set priorities, the bureaucracies that carry out the functions of the state have 
some degree of autonomy and will seek the best outcome.30 The second tends to support 
the argument that the actions of state agencies are likely to change over time, coinciding 
with changes in public perception, state strategy, and policy as a new threat is realized.31  
Both efforts have been studied and continue to be debate, however it seems that 
institutional change is more supportive in explaining how a nation might overcome a 
terrorist threat.  
The bureaucratic model for policing considers the actions of police independent 
of the state.  As one author puts it: “Police institutions achieve institutional autonomy in 
the means and objectives of their activities because they rely on a purposive-rational 
logic to employ the technically most efficient means.”32 This argument suggests that 
despite state efforts to hone policy for action, the effectiveness of police is not influenced 
by the state as much as it is by the ability of the police to develop their own methods to 
combat terrorism.  Additional support for this proposition comes in the growing research 
on interstate cooperation and regional responses to terrorism. The key to success is 
finding a common language and set of rules for dealing with terrorism.  As an example, 
similar questions of political and public debate arise with regard to the European Union 
and its law enforcement agency, Europol.  The political vow of state cooperation allows 
police agencies to cooperate and determine effective means of countering terrorism, 
sometimes despite continued argument over the specific policies of the European Union 
in its overall response to terrorism.33  Similarly, despite the best policies and intentions, a 
                                                 
30 Mathieu Deflem, “Global Rule of Law or Global Rule of Law Enforcement? International Police 
Cooperation and Counterterrorism,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
603, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 242. 
31 Henry, “The Need for a Coordinated and Strategic Local Police Approach,” 321–322. 
32 Deflem, “Social Control and the Policing of Terrorism,” 77. 
33 Mathieu Deflem, “Europol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism in a 
Global Perspective,” Justice Quarterly 23, no. 3 (September 2006): 348. 
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specific agency of the state may seek to make personal or organizational gains at the 
expense of the larger state.  As one article points out, the use of right-wing terrorism to 
further the cause of police in Italy indicates that one cannot always study a state’s 
response to terrorism as a “unitary body.”34  While this point supposes that police 
effectiveness might be studied independent of a state’s policies, evidence also supports 
the direct study of policing as it adjusts to changes in state strategy and institutional 
responses. 
A number of studies have shown how police effectiveness has improved or 
decreased after changes in state policy.  By 1976 in Italy, the police had minimized the 
ability of the Red Brigade to continue its terrorism actions until changes in political 
power resulted in the dismantling of Italy’s primary police counterterrorism entities; the 
group then could regain its foothold.35  Some go as far as to say that until state policy 
addresses the abilities of the police, counterterrorism actions will falter.  Particularly in 
Italy, some point to the recognition of terrorism as a threat by policymakers and the 
establishment of policies to assist the police as key to the defeat of left-wing terrorism.36 
The particular effectiveness of the police in this case is not a specific method, but one 
that is supportive of the state’s policies and strategy.  
While both arguments indicate a basis for effective policing, there appear to be 
gaps in specifically linking effective policing methods to policy and strategy.  Instead the 
actual subject of police methods tends to be considered independent of discussions of 
state response.  This research effort will discuss the methods of policing terrorism in the 
context of their relation or (absence of relation) to the strategy and policy of the state in 
combatting terrorism.   
                                                 
34  Herbert Reiter and Klaus Weinhauer, “Police and Political Violence in the 1960s and 1970s: 
Germany and Italy in a Comparative Perspective,” European Review of History 14, no. 3 (September 
2007): 385. 
35  Tom Parker, “Fighting an Antaean Enemy: How Democratic States Unintentionally Sustain the 
Terrorist Movements They Oppose,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2007): 
167. 
36  Weinberg and Eubank, The Rise and Fall of Italian Terrorism,131. 
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The benefit of creating a model of analysis comes in the structure it will provide 
the reader for looking at the problems of police in counterterrorism.  This model supposes 
that the structure of the police force—national, multijurisdictional or federalized—is less 
influential than the standardized methods and overarching strategies of policing applied, 
allowing for study of policing in countries with varying organizational structures. This 
model allows the study of successful counterterrorism campaigns in Italy and Germany 
for lessons in policing terrorism that might be universally applied to counterterrorism 
strategies within democratic nations.   
D. POLICING MODELS 
Policing methodologies have been the subject of debate for many years in the 
terms of analyzing how police styles and ideologies have an effect on crime.  Typically, 
discussions of policing to turn toward “Broken Windows” and the “Kansas City 
Experiment” as proof that some methods work better than others.37  From the study of 
police methodology, we see three distinct styles of policing:  traditional, community-
oriented, and intelligence-led.   
Traditional policing or standard-model policing tends to be thought of as the old 
way of doing business.  This concept underpins the history of policing, as each 
community that springs up can form a police force, put officers on the beat, and, through 
their diligent patrol of the community, prevent crimes.  The best description of this effort 
alludes to a one-size-fits-all application: 
The standard model is based on the assumption that generic strategies for 
crime reduction can be applied throughout a jurisdiction regardless of the 
level of crime, the nature of crime, or other variations. Such strategies as 
increasing the size of police agencies, random patrol across all parts of the 
community, rapid response to calls for service, generally applied follow-
                                                 
37 The “Broken Windows” article authored by James Wilson and George Kelling supposed that a 
community needed to address its level of maintenance of order to realize reduction in severe crimes.  The 
sociological supposition in this article is that areas where the community had failed to address petty crimes 
such as vandalism and vagrancy were hot beds for more violent crime.  It countered that community efforts 
led by police could clean up the neighborhoods.  This was the basis for community oriented policing and 
came on the heels of the “Kansas City Experiment” which had debunked previous thinking that police 
presence itself had an effect in reducing crime.  James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Broken 
Windows,” Atlantic Monthly, March 1982, 31. 
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up investigations, and generally applied intensive enforcement and arrest 
policies are all examples of this standard model of policing.38  
The traditional model also rests on the assumption that just by their presence 
police can prevent crime.  As officers of the law move throughout a community and react 
rapidly to calls for service, criminals will take note, choosing not to commit a crime 
rather than face with the credible possibility of being caught and apprehended.  However, 
in traditional policing, police tend to be reactive, patrolling areas in which crimes are 
committed in hopes of happening upon a crime or responding rapidly enough to catch the 
criminal when a crime is reported.  The much-touted Kansas City Preventative Patrolling 
Experiment, conducted during the winter of 1972 and 1973, confirmed the reactive nature 
of traditional policing.  It showed further that the addition of extra police in some areas 
(saturation) and the lack of patrolling in other areas (response only), had no effect on 
crime rates, citizen perceptions of police, or the fear of crime.39  Moreover, as a product 
of municipalities or local governments that saw a need for some sort of order 
maintenance, traditional policing historically was highly subject to political influence as a 
direct component of the government to influence its jurisdictions.40   
Both community-oriented policing and the closely related approach of problem-
oriented policing arose to address the perceived and experienced shortcomings in 
traditional policing.  The primary goal of these types of policing is determining where 
problems are and addressing them proactively.  In community-oriented policing, this 
approach takes the form of a police entity that accounts for “the wishes of the public” in 
determining strategy and collaboration “with the public in identifying and solving local 
problems.”41  In this model, the police and the public comprise teams that, through 
interaction and resolution of problems at the lowest level, address the social 
circumstances that cause crime.  The possibilities of crime reduction in this model were 
                                                 
38 David Weisburd and John E. Eck, “What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear?,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 593 (May 1, 2004): 44. 
39 Jerry Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing (Portland, OR: Willan Publishing, 2008), 21.  The 
Kansans City experiment measured reported crime in areas based on number of patrols.  Some areas had no 
patrolling while, others were saturated with constant police presence.   
40 Ibid., 28–29. 
41 Ibid., 67. 
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widely popularized by “Broken Windows” as the need to build a community that cares 
for itself. (A broken window indicates that no one cares and will soon lead to more 
broken windows—and then to more serious criminality.42)  This type of policing was of 
great prominence during the post-World War II era in the United States, when such social 
conditions as poverty, racial strife, and falling public confidence in government 
highlighted a need to engage the public.43  The underlying preference of police 
departments became not the reaction to and mitigation of disorder, but the redress of 
community challenges that led to disorder.  The major outcome of this focus on problems 
within a community was the realization that, through analysis of criminal and 
symptomatic activities, the police could begin to form an idea of which specific problems 
most affected a community.  This is why community-oriented policing is also termed 
“problem-oriented policing,” flowing from a propensity to track statistically problem 
areas as part of the community’s efforts.     
The development of problem-oriented community policing, which uses criminal 
analysis to formulate plans for solving problems, laid the groundwork for the 
intelligence-led policing that dominates today.44  Intelligence-led policing address crime 
across communities by careful analysis of patterns and agency interconnectivity, 
overcoming disconnects that occur as crime crosses traditional community and 
jurisdictional boundaries.45  As such, policing has become less focused on specific 
community problems, especially in light of criminal trends that are not tied to singular 
issues.  Instead, intelligence-led policing attempts to address the problem of crime 
without reverting to methods that are reactive and based solely on the number of police 
officers or resources a particular location can muster.   
Intelligence-led policing sets the context for law enforcement as a tool against 
terrorism.  Policing has transformed from simply a watchman function, reacting to 
                                                 
42  Wilson and Kelling, “Broken Windows,” 31. 
43  This can be seen still today in the tone of departmental slogans such as “to protect and serve.” 
Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing, 29. 
44  Ibid., 30. 
45  Ibid., 32, 36. 
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dangerous situations.  Policing now relies on robust methods for detecting and disrupting 
activity in its infancy.  This emphasis has resulted in expectations that crime can be 
challenged and defeated before it unleashes its negative effects on the public. Democracy 
treats terrorism as a crime and relies on law enforcement to combat it suggesting that 
intelligence-led policing should be the method for dealing with terrorism, as opposed to a 





III. BALANCING POLICE AND DEMOCRACY: A GERMAN 
NARRATIVE 
National security—and specifically counterterrorism policy and practice—take as 
its core mission the protection of state and society.  Yet the same measures and methods 
that preserve the state may impinge on or even imperil democratic values, norms, and 
constitutional requirements.  Thus, in a democracy, law and especially law enforcement 
exist both to combat security threats and to preserve the values and liberties on which the 
state is based. In times of relative peace and stability, this dual obligation plays out as a 
series of balances struck between the requirements of security and civil liberties.  In times 
of violence or upheaval, however, this process and its necessary compromises may seem 
ponderous, if not wrong-headed.  Why should the legal or justice system trouble itself 
with the niceties of free speech, for example, when the nation faces attack or subversion?  
More broadly:  Does national crisis allow for any curtailment or suspension of civil 
liberties, or does rule of law prove require that the full measure of individual rights must 
be maintained at all costs?46  Even in the face of a terrorist threat, government, law, law 
enforcement, and the public must calibrate every response to ensure that neither goal 
overtakes the other.   
The FRG provides a case study of this balance in many respects.  Specifically, the 
German experience demonstrates ways in which law enforcement successfully combatted 
terrorism, and a government used—and uses—law and law enforcement to both protect 
and appease the public.      
In the FRG, the constant balancing of security and liberty has a particular urgency 
in a society very much aware of the Nazi legacy—anti-liberalism, aggression, 
authoritarianism, annihilation.  Since the state’s formation in 1949, the FRG has been a 
resolute champion of peace, stability, and human rights.  Indeed, the first article of the 
Grundgesetz, the Federal German constitution, enshrines the guiding principle of all state 
action in the words:  “Human dignity is inviolable.”  Civil liberties are foremost in the 
                                                 
46 Karrin Hanshew, “Daring More Democracy? Internal Security and the Social Democratic Fight 
against West German Terrorism,” Central European History 43, no. 1 (March 2010): 121. 
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constitution, which reflects the centrality of these ideals to the Federal Republic.  In all, 
the German constitution has what many might call an affirmative protection of individual 
rights—and a distinct suspicion of any policies or measures by the government that might 
restrict these rights.47   
On the other hand, the FRG also has been subject to acute and sustained terrorist 
threats in its history. Perhaps the most spectacular episode of terrorism on German soil—
the 1972 assassination of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics—represents something 
of a watershed in the German legal and law enforcement counterterrorism framework.  
Other threats, including political extremism funded and fostered by the FRG’s ideological 
opponents in Eastern Europe, posed consistent and existential challenges that the Bonn 
and later Berlin governments had to surmount—all without lapsing into approaches or 
mindsets that even hinted at Germany’s annihilatory and authoritarian past.  In the 
process, the Germans have honed both their legal structure and their law enforcement 
approaches to meet the intertwined challenges of terrorism and democratic self-
preservation.  Broadly speaking, these developments have played out in the realms of 
professional policing, preventive models, technology, and cooperation.  Even as the 
terrorism threats in and to the FRG have changed, these four pillars as played out in the 
German approach have ensured both the effectiveness of the law enforcement response 
and the consistency of its democratic nature.  The police effectiveness of Germany was 
aided by a realization that the organization of the police, which was initially demilitarized 
and extremely limited, needed to be manipulated to best support democratic government.  
What followed was enhancement of this organization, through training, equipment and 
methodologies to defend against the greatest threat to the fledgling democracy, terrorism 
as a challenge to the government’s authority.   
A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
In essence, a state can respond to terrorist threats on one of two bases:  military or 
police. Perhaps more so than other countries, the FRG has clearly favored the law 
                                                 
47 James Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-terrorism 
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enforcement model.  In fact, the German constitution and subsequent rulings by the 
Federal Constitutional Court have rejected any use of the military that might be 
disruptive internally or incite war-type reactions internationally.48  German law and 
public opinion supports the use of the military only when Germany is threatened by state-
to-state violence of an existential nature or, within ever narrower parameters, in 
conjunction with internationally sanctioned operations within an alliance.  As a precursor 
to discussion of this struggle in Germany it is important to note some of the important 
events in Post-World War II Germany.  Table 1 provides a brief history: 
Year Event 
1949 Grundgesetz, ratified, accepted by Allies (Basic Law of 1949) 
1955 West Germany (FRG) becomes sovereign state, allied occupation ends. 




Grand Coalition between the two big-tent political parties of the center-right 
and center-left—the Christian Democratic Union and Social Democratic 
Party, respectively—controls parliament and prompts the advent of the 
Auβerparlemetarische Opposition (APO) or extra-parliamentary opposition, 
sparking period of student movement for radical social and political 
changes.49 
1967 Student shot and killed during protest against visit of Iranian Shah.  Widely 
held to be climax of escalation in clashes between students and police. 
1968  Baader Ensslin of Baader-Meinhoff Gang fame commits arson attack in 
Berlin, marking the start of organized, ideological terrorism in Germany and 
point of formation for the Red Army Faction (RAF)50 
1968 Basic Law amended to allow surveillance of telecommunications and mail in 
cases when anti-government activities are suspected. 
1971 RAF kills police officer, first murder attributed to RAF 
1972 Resolution enacted prevents those who pursue anti-constitutional activities 
shall not be appointed to public service. 
1972 Israeli athletes taken hostage by Palestinian group “Black September” and 
subsequently killed along with terrorists in botched rescue attempt.  
Considered the wake-up call in FRG in realizing and addressing terrorist 
threat. 
1976  Penal code updated to increase criminalization of terrorist related actions 
1976 Law enacted criminalizing relationships with terrorist organizations.  Actions 
included speaking out for, or supporting in any way banned organizations.   
1976 European Political Cooperation establishes Terrorism, Radicalism, and 
International Violence council for police in investigating terrorist related 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 93.  Despite changes in boundaries and population after reunification, the FRG still relies on 
the 1949 constitution as its guidance on rights and democratic methods.   
49 This author offers an excellent look at how terrorism grew from student movement, towards 
domestic terrorist groups, and finally into extra-national groups with international contacts and political 
messages.  Christoph Rojahn, Left-wing Terrorism in Germany: The Aftermath of Ideological Violence 
(Warwickshire: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1998), 2. 
50 Ibid., 3. 
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Year Event 
violence.   
1977  UN convention on terrorism 
1984 Interpol sets up International Terrorism Unit for cooperative investigation of 
international terrorism.   
Table 1.   Chronology of The Federal Republic of Germany51 
1. FRG Demilitarization 
Of course, this same skepticism of armed state action, wrought of defeat and 
demilitarization in the immediate post-World War II years, applies to some degree to law 
enforcement, as well. In particular, the FRG mounted an effort to demilitarize policing so 
as to foster stability and democracy at home and abroad.   The primary purpose was to 
“defang” the police as an external threat, yet also an effort to re-create the police as 
champions of a peaceful, democratic state.52  It stands to reason that in the aftermath of 
Nazi rule and the excesses of the Gestapo (the secret police) as well as the role of the 
gendarmerie and the reserve police in the Holocaust,53 the FRG would strive to make 
police as innocuous as possible.  The wider world took the same view, as evidenced by 
allied plans for the fledgling government that included changes to armament, uniforms, 
and police concentrations, in all cases reducing the size of police forces and 
distinguishing law enforcement from standing armies.54   
These measures both informed and drew from the simultaneous undertaking to 
overhaul and democratize the justice system in post-war West Germany—which policies 
                                                 
51 This table highlights some dates of importance but does not specify every event.  A notable pattern 
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Internal Security Policy, 43–64. 
52 Erika Fairchild, German Police: Ideals and Reality in the Post-War Years (Springfield, IL: C.C. 
Thomas, 1988), 63. 
53 The literature on the security and police apparatus in the Third Reich is almost endlessly 
voluminous.  One of the earliest (originally published in 1961) and most authoritative summaries appears in 
Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, 3d ed. (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 2003); see especially pp. 49–60 (Vol. I, Ch. 3) and pp. 275–407 (Vol. I, Ch. 7).  Hilberg updated and 
refocused his own research on the topic in Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The Jewish 
Catastrophe 1933-1945 (New York:  HarperCollins, 1992), which treats both the Gestapo and the 
gendarmerie. A more recent trend in the scholarship has undertaken to examine the role and effects of Nazi 
law enforcement and security forces within society.  See, e.g., Eric A. Johnson, Nazi Terror:  The Gestapo, 
Jews, and Ordinary Germans, (New York: Perseus, 2000). 
54 Fairchild, German Police, 63–64. 
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included the categorical rejection of the death penalty and the institution of a prison 
system firmly oriented toward rehabilitation.  In line with this approach, the criminal 
code was revised along widely accepted democratic lines, including the designation of 
crimes as felonies, misdemeanors, and offenses. Such categories rest on the concept that 
different bad acts in the community have different effects on society and therefore require 
varying degrees of response from the justice system.55 And, of course, the punishments 
or penalties must be commensurate with the severity of the offense, as well as available 
to the public, and so on.  Police methods similarly were brought into line with the 
accepted norms and standards of western democracies.  In a word, the law and law 
enforcement no longer served to preserve the party-government.  
At the same time, the generation that rebuilt Germany after the war imparted to 
the fledgling Federal Republic its trepidation about unrest incited by foreign and 
domestic enemies of the state.  To be sure, the “werewolves”—Nazi true-believers who 
were feared to have marched into the young German democracy aggrieved and unwilling 
to assimilate—never materialized in any number, defanged perhaps by the process of 
effecting and then enjoying the West German “economic miracle.”  But Germany’s 
turbulent interwar years, riven by political violence and extremism that ultimately put 
Adolf Hitler in the chancellor’s office, remained fresh in the collective memory and 
represented exactly the kind of turmoil that Germans wished to avoid. As such, the 
founders of the Federal Republic were at pains to create a legal and justice system that 
favored peace and stability as the ultimate expression of civil liberty.56  For example, 
Article 18 of the Grundgesetz clearly strips an individual of many liberties in the event 
that he or she seeks to use these freedoms to subvert the Rechtsstaat, or rule of law.  John 
Finn refers to this stance as “militant democracy,” not in the sense of a strong military, 
but rather as a democracy that is forceful or proactive in protecting itself—against both 
any authoritarian impulses of the state and of individuals who would work within and 
                                                 
55 Harold K Becker, Police Systems of Europe:  A Survey of Selected Police Organizations 
(Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1973), 109. 
56 Miklos Radvanyi, Anti-terrorist Legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany (Washington: 
Library of Congress Law Library, 1979), 105–106. 
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without of democracy to upend the system. In other words, the FRG is particularly 
sensitive to any attempts to use its democratic apparatus against the democracy.57    
2. Terrorism in Post-war FRG 
Terrorism came to the Federal Republic in earnest in the late 1960s. Until the 
West German recession of 1965, the country had posted consistent and considerable 
economic successes while also integrating refugees and displaced persons following 
World War II.58  As a new generation came of age—the first “wave” of Germans born 
after the war and therefore without the onus of a personal stake in the Third Reich—
student movements became more and more vocal, calling for protest to demand social 
and political change. The German “68ers” resembled their French counterparts in broad 
strokes, especially in their critique of U.S. “imperialism” in Vietnam and their socialist-
inflected view of social justice.  The German movement had particular concerns, as well, 
including democratizing university admissions (heretofore a more or less elite reserve) 
and a more forthcoming reckoning of the National Socialist past.59 As the unrest grew, 
the government considered ever more sweeping measures to quell it, including a series of 
Emergency Acts that would suspend civil liberties in the event of a national crisis.  The 
protest movement gained additional fervor when a student was killed by a policeman 
during a demonstration against a state visit by the Shah of Iran in 1967.60   
Presently, the 68ers splintered, with some groups and individuals listing toward 
extremism.  This development sparked a period of socio-revolutionary terrorism or 
terrorism that seeks to “overthrow constitutional government as part of social 
transformation.”61 Some of the major proponents of socio-revolutionary terrorism in 
West Germany at this time received money, material, and safe harbor in East Germany, 
                                                 
57 Finn, Constitutions in Crisis, 136–137. 
58 Rojahn, Left-wing Terrorism in Germany, 1. 
59 Paul Wilkinson, “European Police Cooperation,” in Police and Public Order in Europe, ed. John 
Roach and Jurgen Thomaneck (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 152. 
60 Rojahn, Left-wing Terrorism in Germany, 2. 
61 Noemi Gal-Or, “Revolutionary Terrorism,” in Encyclopedia of World Terrorism, ed. Martha 
Crenshaw and John Pimlott, vol. 1 (Armonk  NY: Sharpe Reference, 1997), 194. 
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which had rather more to gain from a destabilized Federal Republic than from whatever 
ideological affinity may have existed between the stodgy, Stalinist party dictatorship and 
the would-be revolutionaries. In the radical left of the late 1960s and early 1970s, then, 
the FRG faced a terrorist threat that had both domestic and cross-border aspects.   
This upheaval spawned myriad groups, some of which merit particular mention in 
the context of this chapter.  The Red Army Faction (RAF) is the oldest of the specific 
terrorist groups in Germany, born from the infamous Baader-Meinhof gang.62  The RAF 
viewed all facets of the FRG government as puppets of U.S. imperialism, intent on 
promulgating an imperialist feudal system in Germany and, therefore, subject to violent 
overthrow in the name of far-left social justice.63  On the same side of the extremist 
spectrum, the Revolutionary Cells (RZ) espoused communism and advocated the violent 
rejection of the capitalist tendencies of democracy.  This group felt that imperialism in 
the world was a product of multinational corporations exerting influence on governments.  
Its main point of disagreement with the RAF had to do with the correct next steps in the 
revolution.  The RZ favored the overthrow of the government by the masses, while the 
RAF tended more toward the implementation of a new government by the younger 
academic elite.64  Then there was the Guerrilla Diffusa, a small and less threatening 
group that nonetheless used revolution as a rationale for terrorism and a fair amount of 
garden-variety criminality.65   
The right-wing brand of terrorism in Germany was not necessarily an effort to 
latch onto a fascist past but was more a reaction to the left-wing terrorism by the new 
right.  The National Democratic Party (NPD) was a last bastion for fascists in post-World 
                                                 
62 The Bader-Meinhof gang is sometimes used interchangeably with the Red Army Faction.  The 
group became notorious after Ulrike Meinhof broke Andres Baader out of prison in 1970.  Baader had been 
serving time for bombings he carried out in Frankfurt.  The gang was known for carrying out bombings and 
bank robberies across Germany.  Meinhof, known for writings on armed struggle, wrote regular 
communiques and from these writings the group became known as the Red Army Faction.  “Who Were the 
Baader-Meinhof Gang?,” BBC, February 12, 2007, sec. Europe, 1, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6314559.stm. 
63 Hans Josef Horchem, Terrorism in West Germany (London, England: Institute for the Study of 
Conflict, 1986), 1–2. 
64 Ibid., 6. 
65 Ibid., 12.  The Guerrila Diffusa, appeared to mostly spout revolutionary rhetoric as a means of 
justifying anarchical violence.  Members were responsible for minor crimes such as Molotov cocktail 
attacks in Berlin and on British Army bases in Germany.   
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War II Germany but had become increasingly insignificant due to the fact that fascism as 
a part of the political process was forbidden, leaving those who still harbored facist ideals 
to fall in with the neo-Nazi groups of the time.66  These smaller right-wing revolutionary 
groups, such as Aktionsgemeinschaft Nationaler Sozialisten and Deutsche 
Aktionsgruppen, were not as active as groups on the left, but nonetheless contributed to 
the incidence of fringe violence in Germany   
Together, the extremists of the left and right accounted for widespread fire 
bombings, killings, and kidnappings throughout the 1970s and into the late 1980s.   
Interestingly enough, both left-and right-wing groups also expanded their international 
flavor, seeking to communicate and cooperate with similarly minded groups in other 
Western European countries.  The RAF and the French Action Directe worked to 
organize a European guerrilla movement in the mid-1980s, while the RZ had already 
been known to have done freelance work for other groups. (The latter aided directly in 
the Olympic attack of 1972, providing logistical support to the Palestinian terrorist in 
Germany; by the 1980s members of the RZ were training in the Middle East.67)  
Terrorism, especially of the revolutionary flavor, subsided in the mid-to late 
1980s as the government counterterrorism efforts continued to hinder terrorist action and 
the terrorist groups ideologies started to lose steam in drumming up support.68  And by 
1991 the integration of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), or East Germany, 
coupled with the fall of the Soviet Union had all but eliminated support for extreme 
ideologies and participation in revolutionary terrorism.  Today Germany still sees a 
terrorist threat from extremism characteristic of transnational terrorism, especially as 
Germany has become more and more saturated with immigrants.  In fact, it is well known 
that members of the group responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United 
States used Germany as a haven to plan and then travel to the United States.   
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B. POLICE PROFESSIONALISM 
While Germany’s home-grown terrorists may have espoused grand ambitions to 
change all of society, neither their message nor their methods corresponded with 
majoritarian views.69 As such, the government could measure its response, with an eye 
toward keeping this division alive and well. A basically well-conceived strategy 
effectively ensured that the terrorists remained criminals rather than, for instance, 
symbols of the government’s failure.  This stance also kept—and keeps—law 
enforcement at the forefront of the FRG’s counterterrorism efforts.  In other words, 
police are effective in capturing terrorists, which in turn bolsters the government’s stance 
that the response to terrorism is coordinated and legitimate.    
The FRG’s police forces are organized on a decentralized and coordinated basis, 
meaning that its police forces are not necessarily nationalized or under the direct control 
of the national government, though the federal authorities have a few key roles.  One 
author describes Germany further as exhibiting a “decentralized multiple coordinated 
system,” with several forces under different levels of government but with a federal law 
enforcement structure that controls intelligence and coordinates activities among lower 
level jurisdictions.70  Either way, this structure bespeaks, on the one hand, Germany’s 
federalism, which it adopted after World War II to ward off any concentration of power 
in the central government along the lines of either Wilhelm II’s Second Empire or 
Hitler’s Third Reich.  On the other hand, it also shows how the FRG has streamlined and 
integrated its law enforcement functions in the name of effectiveness and efficiency.   
The worry of a police force that acts only at the whim of a supreme government is 
overcome by a structure that disperses police administration to the federated state level, 
                                                 
69 One of the keys to the threat is the movement’s association with society and the support that the 
movement receives.  Primarily, their violence is intended to deliver a message to a repressed group and 
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River  NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2008), 212. 
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thus increasing democratic legitimacy.  At the same time though, coordination ensures 
that a counterterrorism strategy is consistent and can be maintained.  In this sense, the 
very structure of Germany’s law enforcement agencies demonstrates the same balance 
between effective security and protected liberties that the police are charged with 
upholding in their actions.  Figure 2 describes the relationship between police 
organizations in Germany: 
 
Figure 2.   German Police Structure71  
                                                 
71  The FRG underscores their decentralization of the police system with a strong statement towards 
coordination across all jurisdictions.  While each of the FRG’s states controls its own police force 
(Landerpolizei) the Federal law enforcement level under direct control of the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior is the responsible group for overseeing federal level criminal investigation, crime data 
management, border security and coordination of all police activities in the FRG.  Federal Law 
Enforcement consists of the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), or Federal Crime Agency and the BGS, or Federal 
Border Guard.  Their relationship is not hierarchical over the state police forces as they do not specifically 
direct actions, but do set standards for policing and training while also coordinating efforts across federal 
and state jurisdictions.  The state police forces consist of the uniformed (Schupo or Municipal police) 
responsible for normal on-the street policing and the non-uniformed (Kripo or Criminal Police) similar to a 
detective force charged with criminal investigations.  Another key aspect is the Berietschaftspolizei, 
commonly referred to as “Stand-by Police.”  This is more aptly put specialized policing and trainees.  
Named for their propensity to be used in large scale crisis, it consists of specialized units such as SWAT 
teams, negotiators and trainees that are in attendance at the mandatory, federally standardized 2 year police 
academies, each police officer must attend before assignment elsewhere. Adapted from figure “Germany’s 
Police Organization.” 
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At first blush, this structure seems to suggest breakdowns in investigation because 
of a proliferation of jurisdictions.  However, the requirement that the federal law 
enforcement agencies act as coordinator was and is vitally important to the prevention 
and investigation of terrorism as it contributes to the command and control of efforts.  
What the coordination did for Germany, was eliminate the friction and competition 
among agencies of the Länder and give focus to the overall counterterrorism effort.   
 A credible and legitimate counterterrorist response must begin with such public 
satisfaction in the overall professionalism of the German law enforcement agencies. By 
and large, the prevailing perception in Germany is that police act appropriately.  An 
indication of this perception can be seen from a public opinion survey conducted in the 
early 1980s by a German marketing group seeking to gauge the general desire for a 
completely nationalized police force.  The survey revealed an even, 50/50 split in 
responses to the question of whether the states or the federal government should handle 
terrorism and violent crime.72  This statistic shows that the public was satisfied with the 
handling of law-and-order activities, with no major consternation over the conduct of the 
federal or state governments.  Thus, the requirements of federalism are fulfilled, while the 
decentralized police forces are sufficiently coordinated to have relatively consistent 
practice across the police forces. The effective structure of police forces that led to 
consistent policing, coordinated response, and general public satisfaction resulted in a 
police force that complemented a strategy of coordinated response and government 
legitimacy.    
Of course, legitimacy and acceptance comes down to individual law enforcement 
agents, as well.  One study of German police officers in Hamburg published in 1975, 
showed prevailing perceptions viewed police to be more steady, conventional, and 
examining than the average German citizen.73  For the most part, Germans believe that 
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The study looked at the police from the eyes of the citizens during some of the most active periods of 
domestic terrorism.  It indicates that despite a period of fear on the part of the public, there was public 
confidence in the ability of the police to deal with the threat.   The same study indicated the people saw 
police as “less nervous, depressive and excitable,” in the execution of their duties.  Ibid., 133. 
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police officers are better able control a situation by thinking on their feet and apt to calm 
a fraught situation by not overreacting to stress; these qualities are vital in situations such 
as terrorism that may cause chaos and public fear.   
German law enforcement reform in the 1970s—following the upheavals of 1968, 
as well as the assassination by Palestinian terrorists of several members of the Israeli 
Olympic team at the Munich Games in 1972—enhanced this fundamental embrace of 
democracy and consistent values in the police forces.   To be sure, the police reforms 
most directly addressed the key flaw in the West German response to the terror attack at 
the Munich Olympic games, namely the inability to coordinate and act with common 
purpose. (Perhaps the most searing example of this failure to interoperate arose when 
Munich police opened fire on the Olympic terrorists as they attempted to leave German 
soil—in contradiction to efforts the FRG had made to negotiate the hostages’ release.74)  
But the whole program of reforms addressed the criminal justice system, human rights, 
and more technical training for dealing with threats other than general public disorder.75  
As a result, all police training is organized into one curriculum, extinguishing the 
difference between uniformed, criminal and border guard security and encouraging 
common tactics across all agencies.76  
An educated police force both legitimizes the actions of law enforcement in the 
eyes of the public but also makes officers better able to respond to increasing levels on 
threat through logical adaptation and reasoning.  In this sense, the standardized training 
and education of police in the Federal Republic of Germany serves the perceptual and the 
substantive aspects of police professionalism.  The centralized police institute, which is 
                                                 
74 The entire Munich affair along with the kidnapping of Peter Lorenz a Christian Democratic Party 
leader in 1975 highlighted that the police and FRG were not trained to deal with political violence from 
terrorism.  German Chancellor Brandt stressed the need for “units, who are trained for such cases, and 
would probably have a higher likelihood of success.”  Pridham, “Terrorism and the State in West 
Germany,” 33. 
75 Fairchild, German Police, 151–152. 
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required of all members of German law enforcement agencies, focuses on civic 
responsibility and the enlightened independence necessary to voice original opinions.77  
These training efforts were—and are—overseen by the Research and Training 
institute of the Bundeskriminalamt, a centralized approach that has resulted in “uniform, 
specialized training focused on current central issue and problems of combating crime.”78  
That is to say, all such police training—at both the federal and state level—is coordinated 
through this agency.  In this way, the professional structure of German policing attempted 
to address the critique of the middle-1970s, when, various levels of government were 
calling for a one-leader system of police oversight, while retaining what worked for 
German federalism.79  Thus, the police still function at a local level, providing for the 
public need to have a community security force free of national political influence, while 
at the same time uniting the efforts of police across the country, which contributes to the 
systematic internal security of the FRG through common tactics, techniques, and 
procedures.   
C. PREVENTION, INVESTIGATION, AND PROSECUTION 
One study classifies action against terrorism as pre-emptive, preventative, or 
reactive.  On the tactical level this categorization can be seen as an indication of a police 
agency’s propensity to use force to combat terrorism.  In the pre-emptive stage, the focus 
is not on use of force but on intelligence to identify and possibly arrest the threat, 
whereas during the preventative and reactive stages, force is used to either block terrorist 
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actions in the case of the former or to defeat them in the latter instance.80  The adoption 
of preventative measures therefore indicates a police force that is trying to limit the 
amount of force used as such measures as checkpoints, assaults on terrorists, and 
deployment of paramilitary forces present a danger in public safety.  The efforts to 
support investigation as a means to prevent terrorism, also bespeaks a readiness to limit 
civil liberties in order to facilitate preventative policing.  
German law is very supportive of preventative measures in policing.  In fact, 
despite its focus on the rights of the individual, the German constitution allows—and, in 
fact, requires—the police to seek out those who are a threat to society and communities. 
For example, as noted, Article 18 of the Basic Law allows the infringement of the human 
rights listed in Articles 1–16 to defend the state from individuals who would use these 
freedoms to the detriment of state or society. The counterterrorism strategy of the 1970s 
resulted in the adoption of laws that furthered preventative action and prosecution.  A 
Criminal Code revision in 1976 brought changes to section 129a: it is now illegal even to 
hold membership in an organization that supports terrorism, and terrorism prosecutions 
may now proceed as ordinary criminal offenses as well as crimes against international 
law and humanity.81  Significantly, the law also allows police to act before the 
commission of an ordinary crime, arresting persons who may incite or lead violence.82  
In 1977 and later 1989, the federal German government adopted additional 
preventative laws, making illegal the formation of terrorist groups, allowing 
                                                 
80  This study deals primarily with how police tactically employ force in facing political violence.  
Pre-emptive is a dangerous term as it hints towards a current trend of using pre-emptive force to challenge 
states and groups prior to the commission of crime.  For the purposes of this paper, the term preventative 
will be used as the term this author uses pre-emptive, those actions taken to determine the threat and 
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offense, or who participates as a member of, recruits for or aids such an (terrorist) association.”  Markus 
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evident in their intended actions.  Reichel, Comparative Criminal Justice Systems, 224. 
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incommunicado detentions, and providing for plea-bargains—up to and including 
exemption from prosecution—for persons accused of membership in a terrorist group if 
they diverge details of the clandestine organization and its members.83 The detention of 
prisoners incommunicado allows the police to act clandestinely against the terrorist 
organization without fear of the investigation being corrupted by the arrest, while 
exemption from prosecution allows the police to gain additional knowledge that might 
allow them to completely disrupt terrorist organizations through further arrests.   In 
addition, Article 138a specifically disallowed defense council “at the request of the 
prosecutor, the police, or the court,” if it could be established the defense could be 
involved in the criminal action or might be interfering in the justice process.84 These laws 
appear heavily to favor detection; at a minimum, they advance the ability of police to 
identify potential terrorists before an incident occurs.  
In addition to the legal framework, the structure of the German police forces 
reflects the push by the FRG to combat terrorism by criminalizing actions of terrorists 
and those who supported them. Most notable in this regard was the expansion of the anti-
organized crime units at the state level as well as an overall increase in the size of the 
BKA at the federal level.85   The BKA was also bolstered by the addition of an anti-
terrorist unit in 1975, with responsibility to combat “this type of criminality across the 
Federal Republic of Germany and in cooperation with other countries,” and to provide 
forces to the state Kripos in order to carry out investigations.86  This reform resulted in a 
robust capability to track and investigate crime in general and more specifically 
terrorism, across the whole of Germany.   
The changes in police operations flowing from the increased threat of terrorism in 
the 1970s has been described as a “course of action directed at prevention and early 
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detection.”87  This further hints at the ideal that forces should be preventative in nature 
and showed that police were now intent on pursuing those who might conduct terrorism 
as identified in the criminal tools at their disposal.  The new focus on investigation and its 
enabling legislation allowed the police to uncover the terrorist underground.  Through 
trailing and investigation of supporters, couriers and their contacts the police began to 
make a dent in the growing terrorist problem, with over 215 terrorist-related convictions 
between 1970 and 1978 with most of the first generation of the Red Army Faction 
neutralized.88  In other words, the FRG adequately attempted to maintain a limited 
response by legislation that sought to address the foundations of terrorism instead of 
reacting with large-scale restrictions on movement and other civil liberties 
Intelligence gathering might form one interesting comparison at this point.  As a 
part of learning about those who might conduct harmful operations, intelligence by its 
nature is conducted in secrecy and is widely debated when it comes to light, as such 
secrecy is perceived as contradictory to democratic openness.89  While the FRG did 
suppress liberties and restrict some of the rights of its own in the name of securing 
criminal prosecutions of terrorists, the legislative backing anchored these measures in the 
German democracy.  The resulting police methodology simply identified terrorist 
supporters, followed this nexus to the terrorist, and then utilized information gained from 
these individuals to pursue other terrorists.  This approach is well within the laws of the 
FRG and has had positive effects in reducing the terrorist threat without upsetting the 
delicate balance between pursuing the threat and suppressing democracy.      
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D. TECHNOLOGY TO SUPPORT STRATEGY 
Police may be properly trained and have intricate plans for how to deal with the 
terrorism, but a plan is just that when the agencies are not properly resourced to function 
effectively.  In the fight against terrorism this element of having appropriate equipment 
and resources is supportive of police structure and ideology.  As discussed, the police of 
the FRG went through broad sweeping changes in response to terrorism.  The extent to 
which changes in structure and ideology were effective was influenced by the ability of 
the police regime to adapt technology to meet requirements as a result of this change.  In 
looking at police used technology as a facilitator to state action against terrorism it might 
be best to inquire as to how technology first facilitated a preventative posture and second 
aided in the coordination of police efforts.  Both of these areas point to automated 
information systems that can provide intelligence and widely distribute information 
pertinent to counterterrorism operations and prosecution of criminals.  
The reliance on technology in successfully combatting terrorism for the FRG 
came as a result of a commitment to finding and tracking those that would perpetrate 
terrorist activity.  To put this development in perspective, it might be helpful to think of 
your own address book today.  Ten years ago, you might have maintained a rolodex of 
your contacts on your office desk.  But as the world has become more networked, and 
with the help of technology, your contact list is now available on the electronic device of 
your choosing, at the time and place you would like it.  This has not only expanded the 
size of your rolodex, but has allowed you to make new contacts in place you would have 
never thought.  This is precisely the effect that the terrorist problem in Germany posed 
for FRG police agencies.  What once had been a force charged with maintaining order at 
a local level now was required to track many potential criminals, that did not necessarily 
confine themselves to one place.   
In trying to determine those who would most likely incite or participate in 
terrorist activities the government had in effect established characteristics that would 
indicate what activities were in line with terrorism and had criminalized them forcing the 
police to add them to their “contact list.”  To this purpose the legislative changes put in 
place in 1976 allowed for better definition of activities that would meet this threshold.  
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Notably changes in the penal code and the advent of the “Law for the Protection of 
Communal Peace,” resulted in the criminalization of forming, participating in, supporting 
(financially or otherwise), and glorifying groups or actions defined as terrorism.90  
Legislative actions seen here further underscored the importance of breaking up terrorist 
groups as well as their planning and support in an attempt to address the problem in its 
earliest form, as a group of disenfranchised people attempting to organize against and 
threaten the government through use of violence.  The advent of these laws also suppose 
though that something must be done to find, track and log the activities which meet this 
criminal threshold.   
The tracking of terrorism-related activities is where a need for technology comes 
into play.  Having established a guideline for intelligence gathering or indicators of 
terrorism, the government must then undertake a system able to track the networks which 
support terrorist actions, cataloging the information and then presenting it in an 
actionable form for police to make arrests and the judicial system to prosecute.  There is 
difficulty in each step of this process that begs for some sort of automation which can 
assist in the efforts.   
As part of a 1973 update to the Bunderskriminalt act of 1951, the FRG established 
the BKA as “the central office for the electronic data network that links the federal level 
with the state level in police matters.”91  Part of an effort to professionalize the police and 
consolidate police information in general, the requirement had the effect of providing a 
system that could be leveraged to support the tracking of criminal activity now supported 
by more stringent terrorism legislation.  The technological centerpiece of the system was 
an electronic police information system (INPOL), run jointly by state and federal police 
agencies, and capable of being queried down to the small unit level.92 The automation of 
data greatly increases the capability to actually collect meaningful data, enabling it to be 
used by all involved in the search and apprehension of suspects vice a hard copy file 
system maintained at a certain level, whether that be municipal, state or federal.  An 
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interesting feature of the INPOL systems was its ability to provide nationwide alerts for 
the identification and location of criminal suspects and illegal immigrants along with the 
ability to utilize biometric information such as fingerprints in those identifications.93   
This advancement of technology and the laws to support its use against terrorism became 
the backbone to support the structure and methodology of policing in the FRG.     
The argument against technology, in particular the gathering of data on private 
citizens comes in the form of critics who contend that information can be used to harass 
or target those who are not actually criminals, threatening the public support for the 
government and furthering the cause of terrorist elements.94  Evidence of waning public 
support is found in the FRG narrative.  In particular, an automated system of video 
cameras set up in the 1980s to observe neighborhoods where terrorist members are 
suspected to operate drew criticism as a system bent on “catching the innocent as well as 
the guilty, and abuse is (inherent) in the system.”95  However, any new technology, 
offering the government capabilities to monitor once unobtainable mediums, can draw 
criticism.   
For this reason, it is important that the government used appropriate legislative 
tools to ensure that legal boundaries are set.  The FRG with its established sensitivities to 
criticism of the democratic process addressed these concerns early.  The previously 
discussed laws, which criminalized support of and participation in terrorist groups, 
legalized the gathering of data related to affiliation with terrorist groups.  This 
criminalization in effect made speeches for terrorist groups, donations and other forms of 
support for banned groups, criminal actions which could then be cataloged.  Additionally, 
Article 10 of the Grundgesetz allowed for the secretive monitoring of mail and phone 
communications to investigate these crimes.96   
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In supporting the narrative of balance, the advance of technology should increase 
the capabilities of the police, without generating a case in which this technology has 
allowed illegal intervention.  The FRG appears to have met this guideline as there is 
limited evidence of information gathering operations and their use being outside of the 
boundaries of law.  In fact, cases brought forward charging individuals with supporting 
terrorism under the new laws outlawing such activities were upheld during judicial 
review.97  The lesson to be learned here is two-fold.  First police need to have available 
the systems by which, coordination and intelligence gathering can be effectively carried 
out.  Second, the policies and more importantly the laws for its use should not render 
ineffective the efforts of police to use this technology.   
E. LEGITIMIZING GERMANY’S ACTION THROUGH COOPERATION 
Up to this point, this analysis has focused on the German government’s steps to 
enact a counterterrorism strategy and the specific police efforts to support that strategy.  
A major theme of this effort has been the ability to meet democratic values and as such 
maintain legitimacy with the public by which the government gets it power.  The balance 
that a government strikes must be supported by cooperation at all levels internal and 
external.  As alluded to a cornerstone event in the FRG struggle against terrorism was the 
attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics.  This event kick started cooperative 
efforts to combat terrorism.   
First, as previously discussed, cooperation was a main point of the 
Bundeskriminalamt Act revision of 1972.  The focus did not solely fall on the police.  
The intent to combat enemies of constitutional democracy throughout the government 
was solidified by Resolution of the Prime Ministers of the Federation and the Länder of 
January 28, 1972, in which it was decreed that “only persons who support the 
constitutional system may be appointed to the civil service.”98  Intended to root out 
opposition to its policies the effect of this resolution ensured those who operated within 
the government were focused on protecting the young democracy.  As one author puts it 
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the “bureaucracy continues to buffer direct political contact with the police.”99  If this is 
true, then cooperation among police and other agencies is able to take place in the context 
of what can be done to support their counterterrorism efforts vice focus on the 
benefits a particular organization sees in the cooperation.  This is a minor point 
eliminates the infighting and lack of service that results from politics being played out in 
bureaucracies.   
The second and most important efforts toward cooperation came as a direct result 
of the threat of international terrorism experienced by the Olympic attacks.  This effort 
was a concerted diplomatic effort to seek international cooperation against terrorism.  
The FRG took lead in both the greater International community and the European 
community.  A press release in Germany following the attack in Munich stated “The 
German Federal Government hopes that international—as well as its own—efforts will 
induce hesitant governments to cooperate in the world-wide fight against terrorism … 
confrontation (between countries) would not yield results here.”100  The FRG was faced 
with both an internal threat of socio-revolutionary terrorism as well as the new 
phenomena of terrorism that crossed borders.  The response primarily took the form of 
major pushes in establishing a cooperative agreement and legal framework for fighting 
terrorism in Europe.   
The major product of efforts by Germany and other European countries, was the 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism adopted by the European  Council in 1976.  
The majority of the convention attempted to define terrorism and moreover exempted 
terrorist activities from political asylum rules that prevented extradition to countries 
where the violence occurred.101  This appears to represent a definition of terrorism across 
Europe in some form and forced a responsibility on the part of countries to address 
terrorism that might occur in neighboring states as a result of actions occurring within 
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their own territory.  While the European efforts may not have been a perfect document, it 
did point toward a need for cooperation in countering terrorism internationally.102  
This new found international cooperation benefitted policing in the FRG by 
adding an ability to increase its influence over those who would support and conduct 
terrorism in the homeland.  The threat in the FRG, coupled with an intent of the German 
police to track terrorist support in France, Netherlands, and Switzerland, led to policing 
practices which sought liberal information sharing, agreements on police cooperation and 
easing of extradition complications.103  The product of these efforts was a European 
policing network.  The Terrorism, Radicalism, and International Violence cooperative 
(TREVI) was created in 1976 and allowed networking of information and provided a 
method by which security chiefs and police leadership could exchange information.104  
By undertaking efforts to increase international cooperation and agreement on the threat 
of terrorism, the FRG enabled police agencies to further prevent terrorist actions.  Of 
sixty major terrorists wanted by the German government and subsequently prosecuted, 
twenty were arrested in foreign countries.105  Thus efforts by countries to cooperate must 
support police efforts to recognize and address the international connection of terrorist 
groups. 
F. LEARNING LESSONS FOR TODAY 
The FRG offers a strong case of establishing balance between dealing with 
terrorism and strongly protecting its democratic values.  In this regard, Germany is 
similar to the United States, which is known for its adamant protection of civil liberties 
and abhorrence of any efforts which may hint towards invasion on personal rights.  In 
particular, this chapter has highlighted three points worth underscoring and seeking to 
apply today.   
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First, democracy in its purest form is government by the people, and when 
government fails to meet the needs of the people, it no longer is valuable.  The protection 
of democracy almost always presents a conflict between the maintenance of order and the 
protection of liberties.  As such, law and policy should support what is being asked of the 
police.  If prevention is the goal and there is a need to adopt technologies to support the 
intelligence efforts and coordination of police to this effect, then laws should support this 
program.  In the case of Germany, a focus on laws that defined terrorism activities and 
criminalized certain actions allowed police to act on these activities.  It is similar to the 
debate today on what should be done to seek out terrorists.  While there might be debate 
and some public dissent over things such as wiretaps and police fusion centers in the 
United States, the fact is that the law allows these efforts to a limited extent.  It is when 
the actions of the state or the police do not follow the rules that trouble occurs.   
This observation leads to the second point about keeping legitimacy in police 
efforts.  The mere appearance of organizations failing to cooperate or adopting differing 
rules allows for additional dissent and fosters the perception of corruption or 
inconsistency on the part of the government.  For FRG police, a decentralized structure 
was made more centralized and coordinated by the adoption of policies that directed its 
organization, directed common technologies, and pushes to assign the goal of 
maintaining the democracy to all levels of the state.   Similarly, the decentralized 
execution of such efforts as the “Global War on Terrorism” must be guided by some 
policy that centralizes the goals.  Directing lead agencies for investigation, forcing all 
police agencies to comply with use of a centralized data system and depoliticizing 
bureaucracies appears to be an effective means in making this requirement a reality.   
Finally, cooperation is fundamental both inside and outside.  As noted, common 
direction is obtainable within the country.  However, while international terrorism was a 
relatively new threat for the FRG, a globalized world now makes international terrorism 
the primary threat.  As Germany realized, coordination with 
other governments needs a legal basis to be effective.  Efforts today must focus on some 
common definitions and depoliticizing of terrorism in order to allow effective 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 49 
IV. CENTRIST POLITICS AND THE POLICE:  AN ITALIAN 
NARRATIVE 
Italy presents an interesting case as it highlights the attempt of a government to 
satisfy all sides of a broad political spectrum, while responding to threats that come from 
both political extremes.  In contrast to the Germans, with their staunch rejection of all 
vestiges of their authoritarian past in the name of continually perfecting democracy, the 
Italians concerned themselves less with democracy in general than with trying to find a 
governmental system that would allow for reconstruction and stability.  At the same time, 
the peculiarities of the Italian political system often allowed short-term, partisan 
considerations to distract the government from recognizing or responding to threats.  In 
the worst cases, Italian leaders even tried to use crises to their own political advantage, 
rather than finding real solutions to a national security problem. 
As a result, the Italian approach—to counterterrorism and policing for it— might 
best be described as “conflicting and confused strands of political culture that result in a 
wide variety both of forms of political violence and of attitudes towards political violence 
on the part of political actors.”106  Amid such confusion, the question then becomes 
whether or not this swirl of political practices and expectations adversely affects the 
ability of police to be effective tools for countering terrorism.  The case of Italy 
highlights the process of democracy, over the protection of rights and lofty ideals of 
liberty in finding effective means to combat terrorism.     
A. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
Like Germany, Italy spent most of World War II (and the decade-plus that 
preceded it) as a fascist country, on the side of the Axis powers. Although the Italians 
essentially liberated themselves from Mussolini (first when the king fired the Duce in 
1943 and ultimately when communist partisans executed the former dictator and his party 
in April 1945), Italy emerged from the war defeated, disgraced, and struggling to find a 
governmental form that could manage a divided society in turbulent times without 
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resorting to authoritarian or anti-democratic measures. Defeat also highlighted to the 
people and newly formed governments that Italy did not have the economic capacity and 
infrastructure to make the leap to functional liberal capitalism, the basis of Western 
European integration, as well as democracy.107   Therefore, Italy focused on industrial 
reconstruction and economic recovery and did not immediately address social divides as 
they developed in the post-World War II environment.108   
In these circumstances, post-war Italy arrived at a centrist system of government 
that tried—and tries—to balance the desires of a strong Christian Democratic Party (DC), 
which includes elements of both the liberal and fascist parties of the past, and a large and 
active Communist party.109  Thus, the political narrative of Italy tells of a country that 
has leftist socialist leanings due to its economic structure and traditions of oppression but 
that must also recognize many years of fascist, right-leaning political traditions—“torn 
between its liberal-democratic constitution and origins and its authoritarian heavy-handed 
tradition.”110  In this divided and divisive political realm, Italy’s home-grown terrorists 
also found their respective niches, causes, and targets. Table 2 provides a brief 
chronology of developments in post-World War II Italy. 
 
Year Event 
1948 Italy’s new Republican Constitution takes effect on 1 January, leading to 
election of bicameral legislature on 19 April and its first president on 11 May.   
1968 Right-wing terrorists explode a bomb in Milan killing 12 and injuring 80, 
considered starting point of domestic terrorism in Italy. 
1969 Widespread student and labor strife is evident with many demonstrations and 
sit-ins across the country as a result of economic stagnation. 
1974 Ispettorato Generale per la Lotta al Terrorism (Antiterrorism Office) created 
within the Ministry of Interior to be the primary intelligence gatherer and 
coordination of efforts for combatting terrorism.   
1975-
1976 
The PCI moderates its communist ideas and gains participation in parliament.  
This move toward the middle intensifies the extremist left violent response.   
1977 Intelligence reform in Law No. 801 creates separate intelligence organization 
                                                 
107 Vittorfranco S. Pisano, “Terrorism in Italy” (The Heritage Foundation, March 27, 1978), 6, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1978/03/terrorism-in-italy. 
108 Pisano, “Terrorism in Italy,” 5–6. 
109 Mario Einaudi, “The Constitution of the Italian Republic,” The American Political Science Review 
42, no. 4 (1948): 662. 
110 Furlong, “Political Terrorism in Italy,” 61. 
 51 
Year Event 
for military/national intelligence and domestic intelligence.   
1978 Red Brigade (BR) kidnaps and later kills after “trial,” Aldo Moro President of 
the Christian Democratic Party and former Italian Prime Minister.   
1978 Law Decree No.59 (21 March) and Law Decree No. 191(18 May) criminalize 
terrorism for the first time, increasing penalties for crimes motivated by 
“terrorism or subversion of the democratic order.”  Also relaxed electronic 
surveillance restrictions and broadened powers of police to detain, question.   
1979 Law No. 625 allows reduced sentences to those terrorists that aid police in 
investigations.   
1981 American General James L. Dozier kidnapped by BR.   
1982 Dozier freed during operation by Nucleo Operativo Cetrale di Sicurezza 
(NOCS), police antiterrorism task force.   
1982 Law No. 304 offers clemency to repentant terrorists who contribute to Italian 
counterterrorism operations.   
Table 2.   Chronology of Italy111 
1. Finding a Political Identity 
The political environment requires some explanation as the centrist position 
characteristic of Italian government is a result of the give-and-take of multiple political 
parties across the political spectrum. The Christian Democrats came to power by trying to 
join the center-leaning elements of both the left and the right in the kind of less 
ideologically charged “big tent” party that predominated in post-war western Europe.  
Primarily, the party roster was made up of those Catholic militants who had supported the 
Italian People’s Party, banned by the facist party before World War II, along with the 
upper and middle classes, who wanted to ensure bourgeois values and capitalism.112  The 
party also was the more palatable of the parties in light of support from the West and 
particularly the United States, which, of course, viewed the communist-inflected left-
wing parties much more dimly.  Even so, the DC came to be the majority party, but only 
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by a slim margin.  This fact, too, increased its centrist tendencies, as the party strove to 
reach out to and keep a wide range of Italian voters. 
 The far left was dominated by the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which had 
been important to the defeat of the fascists and liberation of the country from Nazi 
control during the war, causing it to be popular with laborers and leading to its status as 
the second-largest political party.113  In the fractious years between the world wars, the 
PCI had split from the other party of the left, the Socialists, who favored a more 
moderate, trade-unionist ideology—or, as the PCI founders put it when they spun off 
their own party in 1921, the Socialists lacked of “revolutionary resolve.”114  To post-war 
Italian sensibilities, the Socialists also lacked the PCI’s dramatic anti-fascist credentials 
and strident claim to the future.  As such, the Italian left embraced its Communist party 
more warmly than most other western European polities, which tended to favor the 
center-left.    
2. The Political Effect on the Constitution 
The delicate balance and compromise between the right and left is reflected in the 
constitution that Italy ratified in 1947.  Debate over the constitution took great care to 
find compromise so that neither political side felt disadvantaged—nor inclined to opt out 
of the democratic order the constitution sought to establish.  The primary product of this 
debate came in the structure of the government.  The Italians chose to adopt a bicameral, 
parliamentary form of legislation that ensured neither of the houses, the Senate or the 
House of Deputies, was superior to the other.  Similarly, members of both houses would 
be popularly elected to prevent the influence of interested parties in determining 
representation.115   
As expected in an occupied country following a fascist regime, the constitution 
has a lot to say about individual rights.  In Article 2, the Constitution of the Italian 
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Republic “recognizes and guarantees the rights of the person both as an individual and in 
social groups where human personality is expressed,” expecting that “fundamental duties 
of political economic and social solidarity be fulfilled.”116  Two interesting points should 
be made here.  First, on the basis of this statement, the state is admonished to observe and 
uphold to the democratic principles of freedom of assembly and freedom of participation 
in political groups.  Second and more importantly, the new Italian civil rights had truly 
socialist leanings.  The constitution specifies that “public and private economic activity 
may be directed and coordinated toward social ends,” hinting at an attempt to balance the 
pursuit of happiness by the individual with the idea of collective action.117  
It seems there was also intent to instill democratic requirements on the people as 
well as the government in light of Italy’s history as well.  Under Title IV, the Constitution 
enumerated political rights and duties for the citizenry, specifically noting that all parties 
were welcome if they adhered to democratic principles in determining national policies 
and charging all citizens with “the duty to be loyal to the Republic” and its laws.118  The 
balancing act continued in the development of a constitution, trying to assure the ability 
to govern while trying to place the government in the hands of a people that saw 
government as a burden to their more pressing social desires.   
To be sure, the constitutional resolve to protect worker and socialist movements 
ran contrary in many ways to building a government that could be just as muscular in the 
protection of the rights of all and ensuring a capable democratic nation. The Italian 
constitution did address the possibility that individual rights may have to be curtailed in 
the interests of preserving the national security.  In particular, the constitution takes up 
the issue of attempted revolution by restricting the right to assembly given in Article 18; 
it forbids political association that either directly or indirectly possesses a military 
character.119  This prohibition indicates that in framing its constitution, the Italians 
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recognized a past that was checkered with political violence, which begat political 
instability.  
 In effect the political system was one in which all parties wanted to move toward 
the center, leaving those disenfranchised from the parties to seek redress elsewhere. The 
post-war exercise in tolerance that sought to absorb all of society into a common political 
framework was precisely what caused those on the right and left extremes to turn toward 
terrorism as they perceived they were excluded from government.120  
3. Terrorism in Italy 
Like the FRG, Italy experienced a terrorist threat from the fringes of the left and 
right, characteristic of revolutionary terrorism, or political violence aimed at addressing 
social problems through the dissolution of its government.   What made Italy unique, 
though, is the ambiguous ideologies that resulted in confusing jumble of terrorism 
intertwined with political parties and platforms.  This situation can best be described as a 
“thin line of demarcation,” where ideas of fascism, feminism, internationalism, 
separatism, and communism are used by multiple, often mutually antagonistic, groups; 
sometimes these -isms are professed within the groups as combined ideologies.121 The 
confusion between politics and terrorism does not affect the landscape of the terrorist 
threat as much as it bears on the political and social environment in which a 
counterterrorism strategy is pursued, but because this connection is relevant to the 
analysis that follows, a short survey of the major groupings and their messages is in order 
here.  This description of the threat does not include the mafia as an element of organized 
terrorism.  The focus is solely on the message and aims of political violence, rather than a 
description of the criminal enterprise. 
Right-wing terrorism found its support or refuge in a strong group of 
industrialists, civil servants, and landowners who had grown up under the fascist regime 
and felt misrepresented in their interests. As a group, they tended to support low-level 
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violence to right the political direction of the country.122  They aspire to bring back 
totalitarian rule with nationalistic and “community” goals—and a political order in which 
their constituencies would come out more clearly on top.  The problem with right-wing 
terrorism in Italy was its close and almost direct ties to right-wing elements of 
government and the Italian Social Movement (MSI), better described as the neo-fascist 
party, which has stood for (and won) elections more or less legitimately.  In this sense, 
then, terroristic violence represents an extreme expression of a more broadly held 
ideology.  On the one hand, the line is very hard to draw between “regular” neo-fascists 
and right-wing terrorists.  On the other hand, actual incidents of right-wing terrorism 
appear to be for the most part, ineffectual.  “As far as right-wing terrorism is concerned, 
it is enough to recall that only very few neo-fascists responsible for terrorist massacres 
and their protectors have been discovered.”123  
Interestingly enough, the blind and indiscriminate nature of the attacks by which 
the right-wing terrorists hoped to show the inability of the government to govern 
ultimately proved beneficial to the Christian Democratic party.  During the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, right-wing groups tended to target public conveyances and public places to 
create panic and goad the state into adoption of strong measures that they hoped would 
call into question the actions of the government.124  The DC was able to leverage a 
popular fear that terrorism from the fringes would result in anarchy and could threaten 
sovereignty of the nation.125  Nonetheless, neo-fascist terrorism seems to have kick-
started the use of violence as a political tool in Italy and, in this process it forced the 
country to acknowledge terrorism as a threat, demanding action by its institutions  The 
new-found public support for a government response, coupled with political agreement 
by both sides, led to legislation that actually pursued terrorism openly.    
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The left-wing terrorist threat flowed from the political environment of the late 
1960s and early 1970s in Italy. The right-wing posturing with anti-government violence 
had the effect of pushing the left to adopt violent tendencies as well.  The legitimate left-
wing political movements also experienced a period of internal strife that excluded some 
elements, which opted for violence instead.  This dynamic was most evident in the 
student movements of the left, which started in 1965 and extended into the 1970s.  
During this time, student and, to a lesser extent, labor protests had been put down, 
sometimes with lethal force by the government.  The attempts on the part of the left 
parties within the national government to reform the official response to the protests did 
not succeed, which further increased the dissatisfaction with those who represented the 
left in government, primarily the PCI.126   Thus left-wing political violence became 
entrenched, if somewhat self-reflexive, in Italy.   
B. POLICE PROFFESSIONALISM  
Despite distaste for fascism, Italy did not see a mass demilitarization of the police 
forces in an effort to pacify state power after World War II, perhaps because the 
leadership focused more on power sharing among the major political parties.  Italy could 
best be described as a militaristic state for law and order.  In fact, Italian police could be 
thought of as very powerful within the newly formed democracy, intervening with force 
on many occasions, and notably using escalated force to combat protests and labor 
disputes.127  The Italian police, as a professional force, thus bears some resemblance to 
its counterpart in an authoritarian or fascist state, serving in this connection as a tool of 
the government to put down opposition.  At the very least, the Italian police have worked 
in an environment that prioritizes order and stability.  The real story here, though, is how 
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political inaction led to informal police coordination, that later flourished when political 
action led to more formal efforts to combat terrorism.     
The militaristic organization of the police in Italy derives from its affinity with the 
French system, especially the Gendearmerie.  (This model has remained, with variations 
for political-ideological developments, since the foundation of the modern Italian state in 
1860.) In such system, the police are heavily influenced by the military, and, in fact, a 
number of the day-to-day patrolling operations within Italy are undertaken by the military 
arm of the police, the Carabinieri.  Additionally, after World War II, the Italians deemed 
limits placed on the size of the Italian army as reason to maintain a civil police force 
organized in a military style so as to be able to respond to threats against Italy.128   
This arrangement created rival police forces, civil and military, national in flavor 
and falling within the jurisdiction of a number of ministries within the government.    
Today, the Italian system is still characterized as a “centralized multiple uncoordinated” 
law enforcement system with no one force dedicated or detailed to deal specifically with 
one type of crime or the other.129  This structure has remained mostly in tact since 1969.  
Figure 3 depicts the structure of police forces within Italy:   
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Figure 3.   Italian Police Structure130 
The early failure to demilitarize and address functions across law enforcement 
agencies resulted in chronic lack of coordination during the rise of terrorism in Italy in 
the 1970s.131  Some of this friction could have been as a result of a need to maintain the 
ability to police organized crime in the south, as the use of military police was the only 
                                                 
130 Adapted from figure in Becker, Police Systems of Europe, 119.  The police in Italy are 
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national level forces the Treasury Police under the Minister of Finance, the Military Police, part of the 
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effective means to fight the mafia in areas where the local police were under the control 
of corrupt government officials.  Nonetheless the lack of coordination and the inability of 
the government to utilize police effectively resulted in many changes to the ways the 
government attempted to fight terrorism.  While the Italian police did not necessarily 
adopt a structure that was fully coordinated and centralized, they did take advantage of 
efforts of the government to understand what was going on.  
In light of the right wing having been able to influence the military intelligence 
service, Servizio Informazioni delle Forze Armata (SIFAR), there was established a new 
intelligence agency under the Minister of Interior, the Ispettorato Generale per la Lotta 
al Terrorism, which allowed the Carabinieri and State Police to gather under one banner 
to coordinate activities.132  This group was effective in the early quest to combat 
terrorism on a limited scale.  Despite a left-of-center coalition in parliament that was 
concerned with police accountability, the increasing violence and the efforts of police to 
combat them led to some limited increase in police powers, including increased sentences 
for bombings and arson, generally tools of terrorism.133 The Ispettorato, renamed the 
Servizio di Sicurezza (SdS) in 1976, along with a Carabinieri specialized terrorism 
investigative unit, the Nucleo Dalla Chiesa, succeeded in coordinating and leading police 
action.  By 1976, such smaller left-wing groups as the Gruppi Armati Proletari and 
Nuclei Armati Proletari had been decimated, and the Nucleo Dalla Chiesa had gained 
crucial insight into the structure and organizational features of the Red Brigades.134   
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Unfortunately, the political structure within Italy still failed to grasp fully the 
threat of terrorism and almost inexplicably disbanded these groups in 1976.135  In effect, 
the government had finally realized the need to centralize control and specialize police 
for counterterrorism, but had done it at the expense of systems, which had already proven 
effective in fighting terrorism.   
This new found need to professionalize the police, was given a big boost in 1978 
by the Moro kidnapping incident.  The Moro kidnapping incident gave unity of effort to 
the Italian counterterrorism campaign by making terrorism a political priority and 
increasing public support for national efforts.136  As a consequence, the political culture 
of blame and consolidation of position was no longer an impediment to the efforts of 
policing in Italy after 1978.  The specialized police units and the coordination they 
brought to the system were now able to flourish, evident in CC efforts under the second 
Nucleo Dalla Chiesa controlled by the Interior Minister under the direction of General 
Dalla Chiesa, which was responsible for providing “wide information about structure and 
composition” of terrorist groups, used in-turn by the territorial and municipal police to 
conduct detailed investigation of terrorist groups.137  The outcome of the efforts to 
specialize and coordinate was a professionalized police force.   
The centralized nature of the police under specialized police units is the key 
indicator of a move toward an effective professional force as a result of the terrorist 
threat.  Even though Italy had a decentralized police structure, the police began to find 
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methods to coordinate action centrally once the government embraced a unified effort to 
combat terrorism.  This structure was not perfect, nor could it boast perfectly clean lines 
of command, but it does provide some semblance of a coordinated command and control 
structure by which the state can pursue a counterterrorism strategy.  The structure was 
intended to demonstrate the “the increasing commitment of the state to fight against 
terrorism,” responding to citizens needs to be secured; in the end it also allowed a level of 
trust that the police were doing their jobs.138  The actions of the police then supported the 
legitimacy of the government and further bolstered its coordinated effort.  By the spring 
of 1983, the police in particular the CC, were no longer seen as tools of oppression but as 
a professional force trusted publicly to maintain law and order.139  
C. INVESTIGATIVE EMPHASIS   
As the heavy-handedness of the police force gave way to a coordinated effort to 
assess the situation, there was also a move away from the reactive nature of forceful order 
maintenance.    A clear relationship exists to changes in legislation that better attacked 
terrorism through a preventative approach.  While the generalized terrorist menace had 
been primarily used as political bargaining tools, starting in the mid-1970s, the Italian 
government started to target terrorism as a specific threat that wanted specific measures 
and policies.  This legislation, widely studied as “emergency legislation,” had two 
themes: harsher punishment for crimes of subversion carried out toward violent ends and 
increased investigative powers for the police.140  
After the Moro kidnapping, Law No. 191, amended by referendum in 1978, 
allowed police to seek out terrorists rather than waiting for the terrorists  to strike.  The 
law empowered police to detain those who failed to identify themselves, relaxed judicial 
control on wiretaps, and required landowners to notify police within forty-eight hours of 
transferred ownership or tenancy.141 The latter measure allows police specifically to track 
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movements of persons and alerts law enforcement to possible new cells setting up shop—
literally and figuratively—within an area.  Put together with lists of suspected terrorists or 
known associates, the transfer of tenancy can lead to identifying threats before those 
groups have a chance to organize in the area.  The referendum for this new law was also 
broadly supported by the right and the left wings, with more than 75 percent of voters 
supporting the new measures.142  
The important part of preventative nature of democratic counterterrorism is that it 
supports democratic ideals and legitimizes the government by establishing rule of law.  
The police in Italy adopted this methodology in their actions.  To build cases against 
terrorists and their supporters, Italian police relied heavily on papers seized in safe 
havens, on surveillance of identified and escaped terrorists, and in some cases on 
informants, especially members who had been marginalized by the terrorist 
organizations.143  This methodology seeks out information on a problem and then takes 
action to disrupt the criminal nexus before it is able to attack.  The effort to build cases 
and investigate terrorists resulted in 2000 convictions by 1987 and a reduction of terrorist 
incidents from 2243 in 1978 to 412 in 1983.144 Additionally, much like the efforts in the 
German case, the Italian investigative ability was enhanced by legislation that rewarded 
terrorists’ repentance.  The Italian recompense law of 1979 allowed for substantial 
reductions in penalty for those terrorists who collaborated with police and judicial 
authorities.145  
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, police effectiveness in Italy had increased 
thanks to its reliance on such investigative means, fostered by the emergency legislation.  
In fact, some terrorists reported that they started to become disillusioned with their 
organizations because the groups were splintered and many of the people they had started 
with were now imprisoned.146  
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D. TECHNOLOGY 
Italy saw a huge benefit in centralized intelligence and coordinated efforts 
brought on by technological adaptation.  The basis for technology adaptation was set in 
1980, when Law No. 23 was passed by the parliament.  It directed the Ministry of Interior 
to set up a Center for Computerized Information, and all “data relevant to the protection 
of order, public security, and prevention and repression of crimes had to be collected, 
classified, and archived there.”147 Essentially, the law required Italian law enforcement to 
pool all information in a single database, regardless of which agency initially collected 
the material. Because the law was enacted more or less at the beginning of the computer 
age, law enforcement could leverage the latest in technology and maintain a truly modern 
repository of relevant information. While it is difficult to find direct evidence of the 
quantitative effect the establishment of the Center had on the police efforts, it is easy to 
suppose that it benefitted the ongoing efforts to coordinate among police forces.  
Despite a fractured, or at least highly decentralized, policing structure in Italy, the 
control of the information allows for centralization of command and control, by giving all 
agencies the most complete and accurate information possible—and, of course, the same 
information.  Many times, terms like “controlling the information” have a negative 
connotation, hinting that the intent behind controlling information is to keep someone out 
of the information loop.  In this case, information control means that information is 
integrated and formatted for use by all officials who require it.   
The benefits of technological updates to the way police did business were also 
increased when the “emergency legislation” addressed the use of technology, as well. As 
part of the laws passed in 1978, police now were able to tape phone calls and receive 
information on banking transactions in excess of $25,000.148  Such information was key 
to increasing the government’s ability to undertake robust intelligence operations to 
support a proactive approach.  During the late 1970s, the police also benefitted from an 
increase in information about the structures, compositions, targets, and ideological 
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positions of terrorist groups allowing, in which further improved their record of thwarting 
terrorist operations, highlighted by the successful rescue of General Dozier149  
In light of new laws this success seems to have also circumvented the traditional 
argument that use of technology can be burdensome on the public by threatening privacy 
rights.  Despite some mixed public response to the “emergency legislation” and the laws 
that allowed electronic monitoring, there was no particular outcry about police abuse. In 
the end, the system allowed for “a bit of trust to the policeman and to the carbineer”  
when in the past “he was blamed because … he went beyond the permitted limits.”150  
The Italian people were more interested in their overall safety and the effectiveness of the 
government response, satisfied that new rules adequately protected their rights and 
technologies were being appropriately integrated by the police.   
E. FRAGMENTED STRUCTURES BECOME PARTNERS 
If one thing is evident in the narrative of Italy, it is the surfeit of political, social, 
and institutional competition.  As this chapter has already shown, the different political 
parties competed with one another for power in government; the police forces had 
varying chains of command; and the public could be expected to shift in its support of the 
many different factions.  However, the period of cooperation on a national and law 
enforcement level, coming in response to the Moro affair, marked a turning point 
allowing for the counterterrorism campaign to reach a successful conclusion. Working 
together and in concert, police units in Italy were able to completely dismantle the Front 
Line leftist terrorist group, successfully rescue General Dozier, capture the majority of 
second generation BR leadership.151  General Dalla Chiesa, formerly responsible only for 
CC, was put in charge of over-all command of counterterrorism efforts in 1978 and was 
unanimously supported for reappointment in 1979 by all parliamentary political 
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parties.152  The importance of a unifying personality to force cooperation must be 
highlighted.  The new efforts saw immediate results in coordinated efforts to raid BR 
apartments in Rome and Milan along with a broad campaign to ensnare supporters of 
terrorism across the country allowing police to gain information and arrest the major BR 
“columns” by 1980.153  The end result of appointing a chief executive for the police 
efforts was to ensure cooperation. The common cause under a unified command is 
notable in eliminating competing interests amongst police forces as success against 
terrorism becomes the goal of all.   
The government’s counterterrorism policy gained momentum and support as the 
efforts became more successful.  The unanimous approval of the efforts against terrorism 
and overwhelming support for the “emergency legislation” are strong indicators that once 
the government had decided as a whole to address the threat of terrorism, cooperation 
followed. The successes seen in the early 1980s also showed how the government had 
enabled cooperation and further legitimized its efforts, allowing the “Italian polce and 
intelligence agencies to work in the respect of the law free of politically motivated 
constraints.”154  Cooperation in the Italian narrative indicates the tendency of 
organizations to work together when a common goal and unifying structure are 
developed.  This process took a while in the Italian experience but eventually proved 
fruitful.   
F. OUT OF THE CHAOS: LEARNING A LESSON OF UNITY 
Centralized control of a national counterterrorism strategy seems to suggest that 
the country has a unity of vision.  In Italy, such was not the case early in the crisis of 
terrorism that was characterized by an inability of the government to produce other 
elements of a successful strategy—laws that support a proactive approach, organizations 
for centralized control, and unity of political effort that would legitimize its efforts.    
                                                 




Not surprisingly, police floundered in early efforts to find some of the tools that 
would make their operations successful. Despite attempts to formulate specialized groups 
that would allow centralized investigative efforts, the political environment proved 
schizophrenic at best and even disbanded some of these early efforts.  The indication here 
is that the efforts of police to specialize or seek a more professional approach must be 
complimented with a uniting strategy at the national level.  This observation has 
relevance even today, when disagreements among political entities may result in reduced 
budgets or prohibition of certain efforts.   
Another lesson is that despite a decentralized structure, police can find means of 
cooperation that overcome this structure.  This point sets the stage for countries that have 
numerous systems of police control, varying from singular coordinated structures to those 
with various, decentralized and uncoordinated police forces.  The key in Italy appears to 
be that there is a singular national direction and tools adapted to allow coordination of 
effort.  In the case of Italy, this coherence, however late-breaking, came from a unified 
command and control element and adaptation of technology that allowed for a common 
operating system.  Unity of effort is required, enabled by technology and cooperation.   
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V. CONCLUSION—MAKING A DIFFERENCE IN HOMELAND 
SECURITY 
Democracies tend to respond to internal security problems with law enforcement.  
The roles and methods of law enforcement in counterterrorism should be rendered in a 
strategy which protects the legitimacy of the government by establishing centralized 
control and democratic norms, addressing the prosecution of terrorism, and maintaining a 
proactive posture against the internal threat. Germany and Italy provide case studies of 
exactly such a system. 
A. LINKING THE HISTORIC THREAT TO TODAY’S TERRORISM 
What becomes, then, of the democratic response to terrorism in the current decade 
and beyond? First, the violence associated with terrorism can be traced to a criminal or 
organized nexus.  Even, in the case of lone-wolf terrorism, there is always a process of 
planning, accumulating the resources necessary to conduct the operation, and then the 
carrying out the operation itself. All of these phases require the active or passive support 
and connivance of friends, allies, and fellow-travelers. In other words, those who would 
say that “it’s a different kind of terrorism, so it demands a new strategy” are seeking to 
justify measures that not only run counter to democratic principles but also may very well 
miss the chance to deal with a terrorist threat at a meaningful level.  Despite the 
revolutionary flavor of terrorism in Italy and Germany, the subject of their democratic 
strategy was not to eliminate revolutionary thought or to destroy all who would disagree 
with the majoritarian mainstream. The response to terrorism was democratic in that it 
sought out criminals, to protect “peace and prosperity,” and to uphold the democratic 
principal of “rule of law.” 
Second, a terrorist, at all levels, has some beef with government and 
establishment.  Some will say that terrorists target a people or the public, but the target is 
a message of non-support for some structure, leadership, government, or community 
hierarchy.  This assumption eliminates the argument that people do bad things, and those 
people have no position to which a claim can be staked. These goals may change over 
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time and be confusing (or internally conflicting), but the goals continue to justify both the 
terrorist (or criminal) acts and the response.  Again, failing to consider and address this 
broader aspect of any terrorist threat means that the response will be incomplete, 
temporary, and possibly ineffective. 
These fundamentals of a terrorist threat to democratic countries brackets what is 
many times referred to as the globalization of terrorism, or a threat from without that 
challenges a country.  The truth is, though, that terrorism still relies on operatives within 
a nation and attempts to challenge a nation’s authority or ability to govern in the message 
it intends to send.  In other words, even international terrorism remains an 
overwhelmingly national concern.   
B. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Police professionalism, preventive policing, technology adaptation, and 
cooperation were effective in combating terrorist threats in Germany and Italy.  These 
same areas each have applicability in the United States as Department of Homeland 
Security continues to develop the direction and control of internal security for a 
democratic nation.    
1. Police Professionalism 
Police, as an agency, must be structured to support counterterrorism strategy, and 
the police agencies must be able operate in a manner that speaks to the democratic values 
of a country in order to provide legitimacy to the government’s response.  Germany 
achieved an effective state of police professionalism in a centralized structure that put a 
number of federal controls on its police force and training in order to assuage public 
opinion about the police force acting against terrorism.  The centralized nature of the 
system made command and control relatively easy.   Italy provides a picture of a 
decentralized system as a matter of democratic organization; but when law enforcement 
recognized the practical pitfalls of such decentralization, Italy established specialized 
units that had the effect of consolidating command and control of terrorist operations 
within the system.  From these two examples, we see first that the precise structure of the 
police forces is less relevant to the effectiveness of the counterterrorist response.  What 
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matters is that professionalization within that structure seeks a common goal and ensures 
that police address terrorism in a similar manner across the entire structure.  
The United States has focused heavily on the failure of law enforcement to 
identify a terrorist threat and respond to investigative leads as the major contributing 
factor to the September 11th terrorist attacks.  As such, the emphasis has been on 
attempting to fix this lack of coordination among law enforcement and federal agencies–
nowadays couched in terms of a  “reciprocal relationship, in which state and local agents 
understand what information they (the federal government) are looking for, and in return, 
receive some of the information being developed about what is happening, or may 
happen.”155  While this idea is a step in the right direction, the manifestation of this 
suggestion has been a loosely controlled collection intelligence fusion centers run by the 
states, with some states even having multiple fusion centers. Whatever the level of 
cooperation or coordination within the walls of these fusion centers, they hardly bring an 
overarching framework for this vaunted “reciprocal relationship” in any practical sense.  
Indeed, the system retains the culture and practices that cause police to compete with 
each other rather than to collaborate on a national counterterrorism strategy.  The fusion 
centers have become cash cows for state and local governments, with more than $460 
million in federal grants for this effort since 2004.156  
 To be sure, the concept of the fusion center is “intended, to broaden sources of 
data for analysis and integration beyond criminal intelligence, to include federal 
intelligence as well as public and private sector data.”157  This programmatic statement 
indicates a move toward a massive effort to structure police for countering terrorist 
threats, but has focused too much on collecting data and not enough on directing or 
encouraging police agencies toward a common goal of stopping the terrorist threat.  In 
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fact, one of the biggest critiques of the current system is the fixation on collecting data, 
which may not have anything to do with a terrorist threat.  Moreover, the use of these 
entities as gatherers of domestic intelligence has the potential to infringe on citizens’ 
constitutional rights by collecting private and public data without due cause.158   The 
system is not uniform across the board and loose controls make the system somewhat 
questionable in the eye of the public.  
As the cases of Italy and Germany attest, the control of the police agencies is key, 
eliminating the ability of local police to choose arbitrarily the ways in which they pursue 
terrorism and ensuring that response is common across jurisdictional boundaries.  The 
fusion centers must become coordination centers that direct, control, and coordinate 
activities, instead of focusing exclusively on gathering and disseminating information. 
2. Preventive Policing 
Reactive methods of policing, for example, blanket security measures, are a major 
stumbling block to democratic counterterrorism strategies.  The more preventive efforts 
of police to investigate and apprehend terrorist elements disrupt terrorist organization 
more effectively and addresses terrorism before violence happens. In other words, 
preventive policing addresses both the need to address a terrorist threat and the balance of 
the police response within a democratic society. In Italy and Germany, counterterrorism 
efforts were only truly effective after police attempted to understand the terrorist 
elements, gather information on their operations, and take action within the rule of law to 
arrest those who were complicit.  As mentioned, information-gathering has been a focus 
of fusion centers, but the failure comes in not incorporating this into a system of 
investigation and action, which has the added benefit of legitimizing data collection.    
Laws must be put in place to support this ability of the police to target acts of terrorism or 
support to terrorism as a crime, otherwise the strategy may erode the democratic ideals 
and norms it is looking to support.  Another lesson of preventive policing was that 
information garnered from terrorists already captured is of major value in future 
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investigations.  In the case of Italy and Germany, the use of laws that encouraged 
terrorists to cooperate through reduced penalties was extremely helpful to law 
enforcement success.   
The United States has acknowledged that terrorism as a crime and requires the 
backing of laws that allow the police to investigate and prevent terrorism.  The USA 
PATIOT act is our very own version of “emergency legislation” that enabled an 
investigative approach, criminalizing attacks on mass transportation among other 
infrastructure, and punishing those who harbor or conceal terrorists.159 The thing that 
must be addressed in this cycle though is our continued reliance on reactive means.  It 
seems that every time a new technology in detection is rolled out, much debate ensues on 
what the threat is that requires such invasive security measures.  A prime example is 
continued controversy over airport security. On the one hand, there seems to be a 
constant effort to increase security at what some would argue, on the other hand, is the 
continued repression of individual rights for no obvious increase in security.  Vast sums 
of money—some estimate up to $2 billion—have been put toward “questionable” 
prevention measures that have little effect on ability to deter terrorism.160   
Italy and Germany took a bit of a different path, as their starting point was a 
categorical rejection of reactive and blanket measures of investigation and deterrence. In 
both cases, the public demonstrates a high degree of faith in the institutions of 
counterterrorism—and law enforcement has enjoyed some significant successes.  Now, 
it’s not that the United States eschews the investigative approach altogether. Rather, the 
United States has tended to develop new measures both investigative and reactive in 
parallel.  For example, the U.S. Congress has mandated that all cargo bound for the 
United States be scanned for radiation while in foreign port, along with other similar 
attempts to detect terrorism this has led to a ballooning of money spent to conduct the 
proverbial search for “a needle in the haystack.”161  Based on the Italian and German 
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experience, it might be worth reconsidering the reactive measures as a cost savings so 
that more effort can be put into coordinated police efforts and intelligence-led preventive 
measures which have proven effective and are more supportive of a democratic 
counterterrorism strategy.   
3. Adoption of Technologies 
Despite varying structures, both Italy and Germany decided on the centralized and 
coordinated control of technologies to collect and disseminate information.  This 
centralization presupposes that national standards for the entry and retention of data exist.  
By controlling the information, this structure assures a common operating picture for all 
those charged with investigating and combatting terrorism.  The key should be 
dissemination to the lowest level, and control of the technology to ensure the information 
is not compromised by variations in entering and interpreting the information.  In both 
Italy and Germany, it was determined that this effort would be done at the level of the 
Interior Ministry and shared across jurisdictional boundaries.  This approach also reduced 
competiveness associated with some agencies having information and others without, 
which would lead to a fractured command and control of counterterrorism efforts.   
The United States has a multitude of data collection and dissemination programs.  
The lead one of these programs is the National Criminal Information Center (NCIC), run 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Along with the Violent Criminal Apprehension 
Program (ViCAP), another FBI administrated database, these systems are considered 
“exclusive, regulated sets of information, for specific purposes.”162  Unfortunately, many 
levels of data within this system are restricted to certain investigative agencies at the 
federal level.  Additionally, most states have additional data systems that allow them to 
gather information from NCIC but also offer compartmentalized data structures with 
differing standards for entry and dissemination.  This information, considered low-level 
police information includes, suspect information, suspicious activity reports, evidence, 
police records of interview, calls for service and may also include information from local 
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justice actions, such as restraining orders, probation and parole information.163  Precisely 
the information that is beneficial for sharing to apprehend criminals, and the type of 
information that Italy and Germany sought to control.   This system indicates a desire to 
utilize technology to coordinate efforts but speaks of the difficulty in maintaining 
common means of entry, dissemination, and storage of information so that a law 
enforcement entity can access and understand the same data another can on the other side 
of the country.   
This difficulty is surely the product of some 16,600 different police jurisdictions, 
comprising 678,000 full-time police officers.164  It might almost be an insurmountable 
obstacle given the expected issues in acquiring a system that is common to all.  However, 
it is worth study in this area, to determine the feasibility in putting together a database 
that is capable of supplying each with the same information.  In fact DHS has attempted 
to bring online a national database for terrorism information.  The Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN) attempts to consolidate information collected across the 
United States, but limits inclusion to those reports reviewed by DHS and as having a 
clearly established nexus to terrorism.165  By limiting the data and having multiple 
systems with only specific amounts of data in each, the United States is failing to adopt 
the technology to make police more effective.  At a minimum, if a system of regional 
control centers takes the place of the current intelligence fusion centers, they could well 
use the development of a common database and central depository of information to 
equip these centers. The attempt should be to devise a system that can be accessed to the 
local level, which allows criminal information, and as a subset, information on terrorists 
to be shared anywhere in the country. 
4. Cooperation   
Cooperation may already be present, but ad hoc practices benefit greatly from 
formalization of the process.  It is expected that police forces talk across boundaries, both 
                                                 
163 Ibid., 12. 
164. Henry, “The Need for a Coordinated and Strategic Local Police Approach,” 324. 
165 Laura Manning, Homeland Security Information Network Database, Privacy Impact Assessment 
(Washington DC: US Department of Homeland Security, April 5, 2006), 2. 
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locally, nationally, and internationally.  Therefore it is important to leverage these 
relationships and build structures around them that have common goals.   
This has occurred on a limited basis within the United States.  A prime example 
of cooperation at the local level is New York City, which has formalized its 
counterterrorism bureau in a manner which bonds together international and local 
partners.  In response to a threat received by the Central Intelligence Agency in October 
2001, that never made its way to city officials, the city has created a bureau which 
coordinates full cooperation with all aspects of counterterrorism, including agreements 
with major international cities and private companies that allows New York to address 
threats from origin to protective measures and arrest of terrorist suspects.166  This level of 
cooperation is the premise for ensuring the police are able to do their job, incorporating 
the international, national, local and private levels towards one goal.  The structure 
provided in putting its control in a single place ensures uniformity.  The problem lies in 
that this structure at one locality does not necessarily match another at the national level.   
  The federal government has similar structures in the form of Joint Terrorism 
Task Forces (JTTFs).  The JTTFs are designed to be clearing houses where national and 
local level law enforcement are able to collude on cases, but have suffered from a feeling 
that the FBI is exclusionary in some cases, a lack of definitive rules for their structure, 
and a failure to link to some federal agencies in which other crimes, specifically drug 
trafficking may be explored for nexus to terrorism.167  The multiple cooperative efforts 
underway are indicative of a system that is not integrated.   Add in the fusion centers and 
the numerous other local collaboration efforts by cities or states and it appears that in 
working towards a common goal, local, regional and national interests have each 
attempted to create their own cooperative environments.  The system needs to be 
                                                 
166 William Finnegan, “The Terrorism Beat:  How is the N.Y.P.D. Defending the City?,” The New 
Yorker, July 25, 2005, 60. 
167 This information comes from an evaluation of the US Department of Justice’s internal review of 
the information sharing and cooperation structure for antiterrorism.  The report indicates that while 
information is shared better, cooperation is not fully developed and codified.  Interestingly pages 45–55 
detail the level of cooperation between the FBI and the city of New York, indicating that the FBI is 
excluded from information developed by the NYPD.  See, Department of Justice’s Terrorism Task Forces 
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analyzed to indicate how a national level cooperative effort can bring all agencies into 
agreement on what their goals are, and in-turn inform and collude with international, 
regional, and local partners in a structure hierarchical system.    
The Italian case shows that despite attempts to cooperate early in their struggle 
against terrorism, the police suffered from a political system that did not support this 
cooperation.  Similarly, the police efforts in Germany benefitted from international 
governmental efforts to reconcile the terrorist threat, which established formal structures 
for cooperation.  The goal therefore should be to establish formal means of cooperation at 
a national level that will therefore reduce barriers to cooperation, such as political 
disagreement and differing interpretations of the threat. 
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